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This study examines the puppet state of Manchoukuo, established by 
Japan in 1932, and its relations with other nations. The League of 
Nations decided in 1933 that Manchoukuo was not to be recognized either 
de facto or de jure by League members. This study examines both those 
countries which eventually recognized Manchoukuo, and those members of 
the League which held fast to the resolution of non-recognition, and 
discusses the various factors which influenced the policies of both 
groups. 
More than 50 years have passed since Manchoukuo was created, and 
almost 40 years since it expired. The Manchoukuoan government published 
the Chinese and Japanese texts of its formal legislation and other state 
papers in its daily official gazette, which has recently been republished 
on microfilm. The reasoning and planning behind these state papers 
usually remain undocumented because few internal records of the 
Manchoukuoan government survived the Second World War. However, the gen-
eral patterns of decision-making is evident. The circumstances of the 
creation of Manchoukuo by Japan's Kwantung Army, though once secret, 
are now well documented. Official records show also that Japan controlled 
the Manchoukuoan government not only by Japanese military occupation of 
the country throughout its existence but more directly by appointing 
Japanese "deputies" to all senior and middle-level Manchoukuoan offic-
ials. 
iii 
These "deputies" had been officials of the Japanese civil service 
before being transferred to the Manchoukuoan civil service. They re-
tained Japanese citizenship while in Manchoukuoan service, and after a 
few years they usually returned to positions in the Japanese government 
and were replaced in Manchoukuo by other.Japanese officials following 
the same career pattern. It cannot be doubted that these Japanese 
officials "on loan" to Manchoukuo either initiated or controlled every 
major action taken by the Manchoukuoan government. Consequently, 
references throughout this study to actions or statements by "the Man-
choukuoan government" must be understood as referring to actions that 
were in essence Japanese. 
The ethnocentric term "Far East" and the inaccurate spelling 
"Manchukuo" have been retained in direct quotations. In all other 
places, the terms used are the value-free geographic term "East Asia" 
and the official and linguistically correct spelling "Manchoukuo". 
The author wishes to express her appreciation to her major adviser, 
Dr. Robert Spaulding, for his guidance and encouragement throughout the 
study. Appreciation is also expressed to the other committee members, 
Dr. John Sylvester and Dr. George Jewsbury, for their assistance in 
the preparation of the final manuscript. 
Finally, special graditude is· expressed to my parents, Patrick and 
Virginia O'Sullivan, and to my brothers and sisters in Christ, both 
here and in Ireland, for their prayers and encouragement. 
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THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS AND 
ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH 
Explosion at Mukden 
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on September 18, 1931, the incident 
which afterwards became known at the Manchurian Crisis began with an 
explosion on the South Manchurian Railway. 1 Under the treaties pertain-
ing to the railway, the Japanese claimed the right to maintain troops 
2 
in the railway zone, to protect and administer the area. The Japanese 
military blamed the explosion on Chinese saboteurs, a fairly plausible 
explanation, and used the incident as a pretext for bringing more 
troops into the area and routing Chinese forces there. 3 The Chinese 
government denied any responsibility for the explosion, and promptly 
4 appealed to both the United States and the League of Nations to 
arbitrate the dispute. 5 
Subsequent investigations showed that the explosion was, in fact, 
the work of Japanese military officers who were frustrated by what they 
6 viewed as a weak China policy on the part of the Tokyo government. The 
Manchurian Crisis was the starting point of the Japanese Kwantung 
Army's aggressive policy towards China. While the government in Tokyo 
may have harboured some suspicions regarding the Kwantung Army's version 
of the railway incident, they chose to present a united front to the 
1 
world, "and to defend before the League a fait accompli in which they 
7 had not been consulted." 
Initial Reaction in the West 
2 
At the time of the Crisis, however, and even in the days immediately 
afterwards when the matter was brought before the League, the incident 
received very little attention in the Western world. Europe was pre-
occupied with domestic political and economic problems. The depression 
was affecting the recovery of the whole world. In Austria and Hungary, 
the financial system collapsed, bringing down the entire structure of 
international payments with it, anq causing chaos in every European 
8 country. 
9 Great Britain had just undergone a major change in government. 
France, as ever, was concerned about the resurgence of her neighbor, 
Germany. 10 Inthe United States the situation was equally dismal, the 
economic depression and domestic politics creating an introspective 
. d 11 att1tu e. An explosion on a railway line in a remote part of East 
Asia seemed totally insignificant compared with pressing internal con-
cerns. Yet, as time elapsed and the Japanese army continued to move 
deeper into Manchuria, in defiance ·of the League's call to withdraw, 
and in spite of Tokyo's assurance to Geneva, it became obvious to more 
observant viewers that the situation was not as obscure and as clear-
cut as had at first appeared. 
China's Appeal to the League 
China had first appealed to the League on September 21, 1931. On 
September 28, it requested that a neutral commission of inquiry be 
3 
appointed by the League to examine the facts of the dispute. 12 This 
request was denied, however, partly due to Japan's objections, but main-
13 ly due to the refusal of the United States to support such a move. 
The League was unwilling to act on its own in setting up a commission 
of inquiry and thus the issue was dropped for the time being. The 
decision pleased Japa~, which had from the beginning called for direct 
negotiations between Japan and China, instead of arbitration by the 
14 League. 
On September 30, 1931, the League Council adopted a resolution 
calling for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese soil, and 
asking China to protect Japanese nationals and property on her terri-
15 tory. The text of the resolution was forwarded to the United States, 
which expressed agreement although still holding aloof from formal 
participation in League actions. 16 Great Britain and France, which as 
two of the major powers of the League would expect to bear major respon-
sibility in the case of any future League action against either parti-
cipant in the dispute, but which like the rest of the world were highly 
occupied-with domestic affairs, fervently hoped that the resolution of 
S t b 30 ld d . b . . th tt 1 . kl 17 ep em er wou succee 1n r1ng1ng e rna er to a c ose qu1c y. 
Japan Presses Onward 
These hopes were shattered, however, on October 8, when the 
Japanese bombed Chinchow~ While up until then the attitude of the West 
had been sympathetic tpward Japan, the Chinchow bombing seriously 
weakened Japan's position before the world. Whatever suspicions the 
League and the United States may have possessed about what actually 
occurred at Mukden, the prevailing view had beeh that China was rather 
4 
weak-kneed and that Japan had legitimate grievances. 18 The bombing of 
Chinchow, however, indicated that Japan was deliberately expanding its 
course of warfare, despite promises to the League to the contrary. 
After Chinchow, the United States took a much more aggressive policy 
toward the Manchurian Crisis. On October 9, a message was sent from the 
United States to the League, encouraging the members not to relax the 
attitude defined in the September meetings, and promising American good-
will toward whatever policy the League deemed it necessary to adopt. 19 
The United States' changing attitude is probably best illustrated 
by Secretary of State Henry Stimson's efforts to achieve more direct 
American participation in whatever steps the League might take. In 
early October he endorsed the suggestion that a United States represen-
tative should sit in on League meetings. 20 Thus, when the League re-
convened on October 13 to discuss the East Asian situtation, there 
existed more hope that the matter could be resolved, now that the United 
States had committed herself more fully. 
Japan, however, was opposed to the idea of inviting the United 
States to participate in the Council's discussions. Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 
the Japanese representative at the League, was ordered by Tokyo to try 
21 to prevent American participation on constitutional grounds. ·With 
German support, Yoshizawa advocated establishing a committee to examine 
the constitutional problems of inviting a non-member to take part in 
League Council meetings. 22 All other members voted against the control, 
however, and the motion to extend an invitation to the United States 
d t d 'th 1 J d' . 23 was a op e Wl on y apan 1ssent1ng. 
Prentiss Gilbert, the United States Consul in Geneva, took his 
place in the League Council and participated in the October 17 decision 
5 
22 
to invoke the 1928 Kellogg Pact on outlawing war. The Japanese and 
Chinese governments were sent identical notes, reminding them of their 
25 obligation under the Pact to resolve the dispute peacefully. But, 
Gilbert was withdrawn before the Council meeting concluded, the United 
States fearing that it waa arousing Japan's hostility by its role at 
26 Geneva. Thusj Gilbert played no part in the League decision of 
October 20, which stipulated that a fixed date be set for completing 
the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese soil. 27 
November 16, 1931, was the date established by the Council. Yet 
when the League met on this date in Paris, the Japanese forces, far 
from withdrawing. had expanded their area of occupation in Manchuria. 
While there were vague murmurings for some sort of economic sanctions 
to be taken against Japan, the United States refused to support this 
idea, unwilling to antagonize Japan too much and perhaps risk precipat-
. "d 28 1ng a Wl er war. Despite the fact that Japan had previously ignored 
the League's resolution and was continuing to occupy Manchuria, there 
was a reluctance on the part of at least some members of the League to 
do anything which might offend Japan. A policy of appeasement was in-
29 stead pursued. 
Appointment of a Commission of Enquiry 
Japan also had no wish to provoke an open rift with the League at 
this stage, and thus looked for some means by which it could maintain 
the appearance of cordial relations with the League, while all the time 
its forces would continue to push further into Chinese territory, con-
solidating Japan's position there.30 While back in September Japan had 
vigourously opposed the sending of a neutral commission of enquiry into 
6 
the area, on November 19, 1931, it proposed that "the League of Nations 
should send a Commission of Inquiry to the spot,"31 a proposal subse-
quently adopted by the Council with the support of the United States. 32 
Finally, on December 10, a commission of enquiry was appointed 
under Lord Lytton of Great Britain, which was "to study on the spot and 
report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international 
relations, threatens to disturb the peace between China and Japan, or 
the good understanding between them on which peace depends."33 The 
League was to allow the matter of the Sino-Japanese dispute to lie until 
the commission presented its report. 
However, the commission did not get underway until the following 
February, by which time the situation in Manchuria had changed consider-
ably. On December 29, Japanese forces began pressing in on Chinchow, 
and by January 3, 1932, they were in complete control of this area in 
southwestern Manchuria. 34 It was this continued militancy on the part 
of the Kwantung Army which prompted the first of the nonrecognition 
notes from the United States. Having informed some of the major powers, 
including France and Great Britain, of the attitude which America was 
going to take, and suggesting that they adopt a similar stance, Stimson 
on January 7, 1932 sent identical notes to the Japanese and Chinese 
governments, warning that the United States would not recognize any 
agreement or situation that impaired its treaty rights in China, or that 
35 was brought about by any means contrary to the Kellogg Pact. 
The Japanese invasion of the international settlement at Shanghai 
late in January attracted further attention from the West. The small 
American Asiatic fleet was dispatched to Shanghai to express the United 
S I d' 1 36 tates 1sapprova . Stimson also wrote a letter to Senator William 
7 
E. Borah, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
This letter, which was made public, expressed the indignation of the 
U d S h 1 f h J '1' 37 nite tates over t e atest action o t e apanese m1 1tary. 
Creation of Manchoukuo 
By the time the Lytton Commission arrived back in Geneva in Octo-
ber, 1932, the state of Manchoukuo had been established. On March 1, 
1932, under Japan's influence, Manchuria declared its independence as 
38 the state of Manchoukuo, and was subsequently recognized by Japan. 
Notification of the formation of the new state had been sent to the more 
important western powers, but none agreed to recognize the new state 
39 and only the United States chose to reply. Furthermore, in the League 
resolution of March 11, 1932, League members vowed not to recognize 
any "infringement on the territorial integrity [or] •.. change in the 
political independence of any member of the League brought about in dis-
40 regard of Artricle 10 of the Covenant." 
Japan's recognition of Manchoukuo the following September did 
nothing to improve Japan's position before the League. Nevertheless, 
it was hoped that an impartial report by the Lytton Commission might 
still provide a starting point from which a peaceful solution of the 
crisis, not detrimental to either party, might be found. 
The report of the Lytton Commission was published on October 2, 
1932, and the authors succeeded in being quite impartial in their dis-
. d 1 . 41 CUSSlOn an cone USlOns. If anything, they were accused of being too 
biazed in Japan's favour. I . d' h s . u . 42 n countr1es as 1verse as t e ov1et n1on. 
and Ireland, the opinion was expressed that the report practically con-
doned Japan's actions in Manchuria. 43 
Japan, however, felt that the Lytton report identified Japan as 
the aggressor, and especially disliked the recommendations of the re-
44 port. These recommendations, while admitting that a return to the 
8 
status quo ante bellum would be a mistake, judged that the present state 
of affairs in Manchuria could not be allowed to continue either. In-
stead, they advocated autonomy for Manchuria under Chinese sovereign.ty 
but with recognition of Japan's interests in Manchuria. 45 
Such recommendations were completely opposed to Japan's plans for 
Manchuria. As far as Japan was concerned, the state of Manchoukuo was 
to be kept intact at all costs, and restoring Chinese sovereignty there 
was totally out of the question. Japan was no longer interested simply 
in economic rights in Manchuria. The Japanese wanted to be able to 
station troops there, to have control of the railroads, the harbours, 
and the railways, and to have authority over the Manchurian government 
through the placement of Japanese "advisors" in Manchuria. 
The objective of Japanese policy toward Manchuria had gone 
far beyond the 'free participation of Japan in the economic 
development of Manchuria,' approved by the Lytton Commis-
sion, and aimed, indeed, at the complete control of the 
country, militarily, economically, and politically. The 
recommendations of the Lytton Commission might easily have 
been acceptable to Japan before the Manchurian Affair, but 
in the fall of 1932 tgey fell far short of what she had 
decided was her due. 
Adoption of the Lytton Report 
Japan protested openly in the League about the validity of the 
Lytton Report. The Japanese government questioned the capability of 
the Commission, referrred to the "abnormal conditions1147 in China, and 
asserted that Manchuria was not necessarily a part of China. 48 Never-
theless, the League proceeded to determine a policy on the dispute 
9 
based on the Lytton Report. On December 9, 1932, a special committee 
was entrusted with the Task of drawing up a draft report and proposals, 
based on the findings of the Lytton Commission. 49 
Meanwhile, however, Japan was still expanding its actions in China. 
Since the winter of 1931, some groups in the Japanese military had 
argued that Japan needed also to control the Innter Mongolian province 
f J h 1 . d J I • . • M h . 50 o e o , 1n or er to protect apan s pos1t1on 1n anc ur1a. This 
proposal was opposed by the foreign andnaval ministries, who feared that 
such action might precipitate hostilities with the Soviet Union and dis-
troy any possibility of finding a satisfactory solution to the Mukden 
incident within the League of Nations. 51 
This latter consideration became redundant by December, 1932, when 
it became known that the Lytton Report rejected the legitimacy of Man-
52 
choukuo, while Russia's passive policy in the whole Sino-Japanese 
dispute indicated that it was not likely to act, even if Japan moved 
into Jeho1. 53 At the very time that the draft report was being brought 
before the League Assembly in February, 1933, Japan was invading Jeho1. 54 
On March 4, the capital of Jehol was occupied and the entire province 
55 was quickly brought under Japenese control. This brought Manchoukuo's 
boundary up to the Great Wall, a very short distance from Peking. 
On February 24, 1933, the draft report was presented to the League 
Assembly. A resolution to adopt the report was approved by a vote of 
42 to one, with one nation abstaining and 13 not voting. 56 The nations 
voting for the resolution are grouped geographically in Table I. Japan 
voted against the resolution, and Siam (Thailand) abstained. 57 Table II 
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*Countries which voted for the League Report of 1933. 
**Countries which abstained. 
++Countries which voted against the Report. 
The remaining countries did not vote. 
11 
12 
Japan cannot have been too surprised at the outcome; nevertheless, 
it was disappointed. On hearing the outcome of the vote, Matsuoka 
Yosuke, the Japanese representative in the Assembly, read a statement 
and then, "followed by the Japanese delegation in solemn procession, 
dramatically left the chamber."58 A month later, on March 27, Japan 
formally notified the League of its intention to withdraw from member-
h . . h L 59 s 1p 1n t e eague. 
Summary 
The explosion of Mukden had thus provoked an open rift in the com-
munity at nations, and had confronted the League of Nations with one of 
the most difficult problems it was to experience in its entire history. 
The manner and the extent to which the League fulfilled its responsibil-
ities in the Manchurian Crisis would greatly affect the prestige and 
the efficacy of the League before the world. In its report of Febru-
ary 24, the League recommended that Manchuria be made an autonomous 
state under Chinese sovereignty, that Japanese forces outside the rail-
way zone be withdrawn, that negotiations take place between China and 
Japan, and that the members of the League not recognize the state of 
Manchoukuo, either de facto or de jure. 60 Unwilling to impose economic 
or military sanctions, the League was unable to implement any but the 
last of these proposals. This paperwill focus, to a large extent, on 
how well this policy was carried out by the members of the League. 
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CHAPTER II 
MANCHURIA: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
Why should an explosion on a remote site on a railway line in East 
Asia have provoked such widespread concern around the world? To under-
stand the importance of Manchuria in the international relations of the 
East, one must probe back into history and discover the special interests 
which many of the powers harboured there. For various reasons, the 
area of Manchuria came to be identified as the "cockpit" of Asia, from 
which much of the East Asian foreign policy was dictated, Why? 
Until 1931, Manchuria was an integral part of China, the government 
of China having de jure control over it. 1 In spite of this, however, 
Japan, at least since 1895, had regarded Manchuria as an area of special 
interest to Japan's welfare, and had established various legal claims 
there. Western powers, including Russia, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
and the United States had also displayed some interest in the area, but 
none of these had come to regard Manchuria as a vital concern. Japan, 
however, over the years came to view Manchuria as indispensable to its 
national security, and when an opportunity came in 1931, the Japanese 
army took it, and moved in to completely control the area. 
17 
18 
The Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895 
Just when Japan began to perceive Manchuria as being vitally im-
portant to it is difficult to determine, but Japan's first demands con-
cerning the area came with the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 ending the 
first Sino-Japanese War. By the terms of this treaty, Japan acquired 
not only Taiwan and the Pescadores, but also the Liaotung Peninsula in 
southern Manchuria. 2 Japan did not enjoy these new Manchurian rights 
for very long. Eighty days after the treaty, a "triple intervention" 
by France, Germany, and Russia, none of which had any desire to see 
Japan become too powerful in the East, "advised" Japan to restore the 
Liaotung Peninsula to China. 3 Japan could not but comply with these 
"recommendations" and handed the Manchurian territory back to China. 
Relations with Russia 
Russo-Japanese rivalry was intensified by the fact that almost 
immediately after this incident, Russia obtained a lease of the same 
peninsula from China. 4 Russia went even further after the Boxer rebel-
lionof 1889-1901, and secured de facto military control of Manchuria. 5 
At the same time, both Russia and Japan began to take an increasing 
interest in Korea, which eventually r'esulted in the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904-1905. 6 Again Japan was victorious, and in the Treaty of Ports-
mouth which conluded the war, Japan inherited the treaty rights of 
Russia in Manchuria. These included the leased area in the Liaotung 
(Kwantung) peninsula, the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way with attached mining rights, and the right to keep troops in 
Manchuria to protect its portion of the railway? This transferral of 
19 
treaty rights was accepted by China in a Sino-Japanese treaty of 1905. 8 
Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan, through a series of 
secret agreements with Russia, endeavoured to consolidate its position 
in Manchuria. The treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916 granted 
Russian recognition of Japan's special interests in southern Manchuria, 
while Japan accorded the same recognition to Russian interests in 
northern Manchuria. 9 While these agreements became void with the sue-
cession to power of Kerensky's Provisional Government in Russia in 
March, 1917, their very existence, albeit for a short time, indicates 
Japan's paramount and growing interest in Manchuria even at this early 
10 stage. 
Foreign Consortiums in Manchuria 
Japan's claims to a special interest in Manchuria were further 
demonstrated by its objections to the attempts of some Western powers 
to invest in Manchuria at the beginning of the twentieth century. Most 
of the Western powers had agreed to abide by U.S. Secretary of State 
John Hay's open door notes of 1898, which provided for the rights of 
all to carry on trade with China, and prohibited any one country from 
bl . h. d 1 · ch· 11 esta 1s 1ng a tra e monopo y 1n 1na. While Manchuria was not of 
especial interest to the Western powers, there were in the early 1900's 
some attempts to invest in railway construction there and in the rest 
of China. 
At first, Chinese authorities approached the United States for 
loans to finance various public projects. 12 The United States had 
encouraged China to invite other countries to participate in the loans, 
especially Germany, France, and Great Britain, all of which had already 
20 
. d' d . 13 1n 1cate 1nterest. This led to the formation of the Four Power 
Banking Group, or Four Power Consortium in 1910. 14 Japan and Russia 
were invited to join in the venture, but while both were interested, 
they were afraid that such an agreement would injure their own special 
. . M h . 15 1nterests 1n anc ur1a. Political disorder in China, however, re-
sulted in the whole venture falling through, and it was not until 1918 
that the idea was broached again. 
The Twenty-One Demands 
The twenty-one demands which Japan presented to China in 1915 
demonstrated both Japan's territorial ambitions regarding China as a 
while, and, more specifically, Japan's territorial and administrative 
ambitions concerning Manchuria. Though China protested and by leaking 
the demands to the press, managed to ~ersuade Japan to back down on the 
most outrageous ones, Japan still gained most of what it wanted. 16 
This included the extension of Japan's leases of the Liaotung Peninsula 
and the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden railways, the right to lease 
land in Manchuria for commericial purposes, the right to develop mines 
in the best mining area of southern Manchuria, and the "right for 
Japanese advisers ••• to be given preference in case foreign 
advisers are required in South Manchuria."17 
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement 
These rights were, however, insecure if the international community 
refused to recognize them. Thus in the years preceding the Washington 
Conference of 1921-1922, Japan sought acknowledgment of her spheres of 
interest from the larger Western powers. The Lansing-Ishii agreement 
21 
between American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing and the Japanese 
representative, Viscount Ishii, was regarded by Japan as a great step 
in achieving this goal. According to the agreement, the United States 
acknowledged 
that territorial propinquity creates special relations 
between two countries, and, consequently, the government 
of the United States recognizes that Japan has special 
interests in China, particularly in the part to which her 
possessions [Korea] are contiguous.l8 
While the agreement also contained an affirmation of the principles 
of the Open Door policy, it certainly could be taken to imply American 
recognition of Japan's special position regarding Manchuria. 
The Washington Conference 
However, that idea was soon dispelled by the Washington Conference 
of 1921-1922. While the conference was obstensibly convened to discuss 
limitation of armaments, it was also used by the United States as a 
means of curbing Japan's growing ascendancy in East Asia. To secure 
the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was an important 
defensive alliance for Japan, was one of the United States' main ob-
jectives at the conference, and it was achieved. 19 The United States 
also managed to persuade Japan to renounce its political claims in 
Shantung, which Japan had gained in the Versailles peace treaty after 
the First World War. 20 The Nine Power Treaty, also signed at the 
Washington Conference provided for maintenance of the Open Door policy 
of equal commerical opportunity in China. This placed further limits 
on Japan's plans forexpansion onto the Asian mainland. 21 However, 
apart from the general terms embodied in the Nine Power Treaty, regard-
ing the protection of Chinese sovereignty, Japan made no concessions 
22 
at the Washington Conference regarding her position in Manchuria. 22 
1920; The Banking Consortium 
A few years earlier, in 1918, the idea of establishing an inter-
national banking consortium in China had been ressurected. Japan which 
had monopolised loans to China while the Western powers were engaged 
in the World War, and the United States both supported formation of an 
international consortium, to include France and Great Britain, which 
ld d k 1 . . ch· 23 wou un erta e oan operat1ons 1n 1na. 
In May, 1919, banking representatives from the four countries met 
in Paris to draw up plans for the consortium, but actual establishment 
was delayed until the summer of 1920. as Japan tried to obtain guaran-
24 tees that its special interests in Manchuria be protected. Japan 
wanted the other countries involved to agree that the consortium would 
. . M h . 25 not 1ntervene 1n anc ur1a. The other powers refused, but gave gen-
eral assurance that they would not engage in any activity detrimental 
to Japan's economic security or national defence, and promised not to 
• . 26 
"countenance any operations inimical to such interests." With these 
general promises, Japan had to be content, and on October 15, 1920, the 
formal agreement establishing the consortium was signed. 27 
Continued Japanese Interest in Manchuria 
By her actions since 1895, Japan had clearly shown that it regarded 
Manchuria as an area of special interest in Japan's national security. 
This theme continued unabated throughout the 1920's. Japan had exten-
sive treaty rights in the area, including both commercial and military 
privileges. Japan was also coming, more and more, to view Manchuria 
23 
as vital to Japan's future. Manchuria was to provide vital raw mater-
ials necessary for Japan's industrial survival and for defense. Man-
churia might also be an outlet for Japan's growing population, and a 
springboard for future Japanese expansion, both in terms of its stra-
. . . d . f . d. f f 28 • teg1c pos1 t1on, an 1n terms o prov1 1ng resources or \var are. A 
South Manchurian Railway official summed up the prevailing Japanese 
attitude when he wrote: 
• Manchuria and Mongolia are Japan's lifeline ••• 
Every nation has a lifeline that holds the key to its exis-
tence. As Gibraltar and Malta are to Great Britain, and 
the Caribbean Sea to America, there definitely is an import-
ant point from which it is impossible to retreat if the 
nation expects to exist.29 
Japan's later actions in Manchuria must be seen in the light of this 
concern for national security. 
In the 1920's, relations between Japan and China deteriorated. 
The launching of the Northern Expedition by the Chinese Kuomintang army 
greatly alarmed Japanese expansionists, as the success of the Expedi-
tion could hasten the reunification of China, diminish Japan's influence 
th d . t tl 1 J I • M h . 30 ere, an more 1mpor an y, oosen apan s gr1p on anc ur1a. The 
Japanese military especially were annoyed by the frequency of disputes 
regarding their rights in Manchuria. While Baron Shidehara, the Japan-
ese Foreign Minister, advocated .a policy of patience towards China, 
working within the framework of international law, the military pushed 
. . 31 
for more immediate and coercive act1on. Prior to the 1931 Mukden 
incident, the Japanese military were considering three options: (1) to 
force concessions from Chang Hsueh-liang, the governor of Manchuria, 
(2) to replace Chang by a government more cooperative with Japan, and 
(3) t ·1· . f M h · 32 o stage a m1 1tary occupat1on o anc ur1a. On September 18, 
1931, judging that the situation was deterioriating, and that the time 
24 
was right, Japanese troops, solely under the directions of their local 
'1' d M h · 33 m1 1tary comman ers, overran anc ur1a. 
Summary 
The actions in Manchuria in September, 1931, did not result from 
a sudden whim on the part of the Japanese military. Rather, they were 
the result of a continuing Japanese policy of special interest in Man-
churia and a growing belief that if Japan was to survive as a powerful 
nation in world affairs, it must have the land and raw materials of 
Manchuria. This belief was particularly strong in the Japanese army 
in the early 1900's, and thus, on September 18, 1931 they took matters 
into their own hands and proceeded to conquer Manchuria, placing Japan 
in an aggressive, isolated position before the rest of the world. When 
other governments of the world decided not to recognize Manchuokuo, they 
were expressing their disapproval of Japan's violations of international' 
law, and its policy of expansion on the Asian mainland. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF RECOGNITION 
Introduction 
In the League's final conclusions on the Sino-Japanese dispute in 
Manchuria, on February 24, 1933, it was agreed that the members of the 
League should not extend either de jure or de facto recognition to the 
exisitng regime in Manchoukuo which had been established almost a year 
1 . 1 ear 1er. An Advisory Committee was subsequently set up to examine the 
practical implications of such a policy and to make due recommendations 
to the members of the League regarding the matter. 2 
This concerted policy of nonrecognition by League members was 
broken soon afterwards when the government of El Salvador extended 
de jure recognition to Manchoukuo and established diplomatic relations 
3 with the government there. In the following years, continuing up 
until 1941, other countries, many of them former members of the League 
of Nations, granted de jure or de facto recognition to the government 
in Manchoukuo. Even those countries which did not announce regogni-
tion established some kind of relations with Manchoukup--in trade, in 
exchanging mail, or in keeping consuls in Manchoukuo. Did such rela-
tions imply recognition? What conditions must exist before it can be 




Definition of Recognition 
According to international law, the acquisition of land by peace-
ful means, or the occupation of territoriun' nullus by means conforming 
to the rules of the international commmunity, gives rise to valid 
title. 4 This also imposes on other states the duty to recognize the 
validity of this new title. Conversely, a situation which arises out 
of actions which violate international laws cannot claim the same right 
to recognition. 5 "Recognition is unnecessary •.• only when the law-
fulness of the act giving rise to the pretended title is clear and 
undisputed."6 
Are there any prerequisites which must be satisfied before recog-
nition of a state may be accorded? Lauterpacht states that there is 
only one basic principle which is essential for recognition, and that 
is the "effectiveness of power within the state and of [its] actual 
independence of other states. 117 Chen lays out more detailed conditions 
whJch should be satisfied before a state is granted recognition. 
Citing Oppenheim, he gives these conditions as people. country, govern-
8 ment, and sovereign government. A group of people must be living in 
a community to make up a state. These people must be settled in a 
territory having definite boundaries. A government commanding the 
obedience of the majority of the people must exist. Finally, the state 
requiring recogniton must have a sovereign government, "a power, 
9 autonomous, undelegated, and distinct form all external powers." 
Recognition of a state does not necessarily imply recognition of 
10 the government of that state. Thus, in 1922, the United States 
refused recognitionto the government of Mexico, having "no official 
relations with that administration. This fact, however, does not 
29 
affect the recognition of the Mexican State itself."11 In the present 
case of Manchoukuo, however, it does appear that those states which 
accorded recognition to the government or to the state of Manchoukuo 
saw the two processes as being synonymous. 
Distinction Between De Jure and 
De Facto Recognition 
While, in the case of Manchoukuo, most states granted the regime 
there de jure recognition, some accorded only de facto recognition. 
What is the distinction between the two? Many opposing views have 
been put forward on this issue. Some authorities define a de jure 
government as one which comes into being by means which are in accor-
dance with the constitutional regulations of the state in question. 12 
Lauterpacht rejects this definition. He argues that the important 
distinction between de facto· and de jure recognition lies not in any 
adherence to,the constitutional law of the state, but in an adherence 
to the requirements of international law. 
Recognition de facto takes place when, in the opinion of 
the recognizingstate,_notwithstanding, the presence of 
the principal condition of recognition, namely, that of 
effectiveness, there are absent other conditions of recog-
nition which, in the opinion of the state in question are 
required by international law.l3 
Whatever the legal aspects or implications of de facto recogni-
tion, many writers agree that such recognition implies a certain 
"lack of intimacy 11 between the recognizing state and the state being 
recognized. 
Normally, recognition should be full and complete, i.e. 
de jure; de facto recognition must be regarded as an 
exception, and as a modification of the normal relationship 
existing between states.l5 
Chen further comments: 
Although de facto· recognition may be sufficient evidence 
of the actual existence of a new state or government, it 
may not be a sufficient indication of the intention of 
the recognizing state to treat it in the fullness of inter-
national relations.l6 
30 
Thus, de facto recognition becomes an expedient which another state may 
adopt in order to carry out business with the state desiring recog-
nition, but de jure recognition is withheld until the new state is 
. d d b b h . 1 . h f h . . 17 JU ge to e e av1ng proper y 1n t e eyes o t e recogn1z1ng state. 
De facto recognition, then, does not carry with it the same measure of 
1 d d . . . 18 approva as o~s e JUre recogn1t1on. Lauterpacht goes on further and 
suggests that de facto recognition is of a provisional nature and is 
subject to withdrawa1. 19 
Questions Regarding Trade, Postal Services, 
and Counsular Relations 
Granted that de facto .recognition may not confer the same 
approval of a situation as does de jure recognition, what distinctions 
does one look for in endeavoring to determine whether de facto· or 
de jure recognition has taken place? Some authorities define consular 
and commercial relations as being de facto· relations. 20 On the 
other hand, the formal opening of diplomatic·. relations tends to be 
regarded as an indication of de jure recognition. 21 However, there do 
not appear to be any clear-cut universally accepted distinctions 
between de facto and de jure relations. 
31 
Discussion of These Issues in 
the League of Nations 
Perhaps because it is so difficult in practice to distinguish 
between de facto and de jure recognition, the League of Nations in its 
February, 1933 resolution on the Sino-Japanese dispute stated that 
neither de facto nor de jure recognition was to be accorded to the 
regime in Manchoukuo, and went on to recommend certain measures which 
its members were to adopt to show their total nonrecognition of 
Manchoukuo. 22 It was suggested that members should do all in their 
power to prevent the admission of Manchoukuo to any international 
b d . 23 o 1es. In the matter of currency, it was recommended that official 
t . . M h k b · d 24 quo at1ons 1n anc ou uoan currency not e perm1tte • In the areas 
of consular relations, and the adoption of technical agreements between 
the Manchoukuoan postal authorities and members of the League, indivi-
dual members were allowed to make their own decisions. 25 No explicit 
reference was ever made in the League regarding the subject of com-
mercial relations with Manchoukuo, or the investment of outside 
capital in that state. 
According to certain authorities, some relations and conditions 
imply at least de facto recognition between two states. Do the areas 
which the League left to the decision of individual members, such as 
consular and commmercial relations, fall into this category? For 
example, many members of the League maintained consuls in Manchoukuo. 
Did this imply recognition? 
There is a considerable difference of opinion on this. The 
League, when it let members form their own policy in this area, stated 
32 
explicitly that if consuls were established in Manchoukuo, they were 
to do or say nothing which might imply recognition on the part of the 
sending state. 26 According to Wood27 and Chen28 , a consul does not 
represent the sending state in the same manner that a diplomatic 
representative does. His function is to ensure the rights and inter-
ests of the sending state, and to ensure the protection of its nationals 
odo 0 h 0 0 29 res1 1ng 1n t e rece1v1ng state. 
According to some sources, then, the presence of a consul in an 
unrecognized state does not 30 imply recogniton of that state. Others 
maintain that the crucial question in determining whether or not a 
state has extended recognition to the receiving state is whether or 
31 not applications for a formal exequatur has been made. Normally a 
person acquires consular status "only after he has received a commis-
sion • from the sending state and an exequatur from the receiving 
state."32 0 h 0 33 and Gould34 h 1° 0 f h ppen e1m agree t at app 1cat1on or sue 
an exequatur implies recognition of the receiving state. 
Thus, in examining the position of nations that maintained 
consuls in Manchoukuo, the decisive factor would be whether these con-
suls had been there before the establishment of the Manchoukuoan 
regime and were simply allowed (both by Manchoukuo and by the sending 
states) to remain there, or whether the sending states had applied to 
the Manchoukuoan government after 1932 for new exequaturs. 
The author has not been able to establish whether or not new 
exequaters were applied for by foreign governments after the establish-
ment of Manchoukuo. It seems likely that if such action had taken 
place, the Japanese or Manchoukuoan governments would have made the 
news public, as such a gesture would have indicated some measure of 
33 
recognition for the new state. 
A January, 1934 issue of the New York Times reported that the 
Manchurian press was "excited over reports that the British Consul 
at Dairen is negotiating with Hsinking for opening a new consulate in 
the Manchukuo capital."35 However, no further attention was brought 
to this supposed action on the part of Great Britain. Indeed, in the 
London,Times a month later, Sir John Simon, the British Foreign 
Secretary, stated that while British consular representatives were 
present in Manchuria, maintaining "such relations with the appropriate 
authorities as appeared to be necessitated by British interests", 
there was no question that British recognition was involved in these 
1 . 36 re at1ons. 
Quite a number of countries which had consuls in Manchuria before 
the establishment of Manchuokuo kept these consuls there after the 
League resolution of 1933, even those which were League members. By 
1941, however, this number had changed considerably, being reduced 
almost exclusively to the Axis powers, as shown in Table III. This 
decline was due chiefly to the outbreak of World War II in 1939. 
Manchoukuo never succeeded in establishing very many consular or 
diplomatic services abroad. The countries in which it did maintain 
such services were almost entirely Axis associates or Japanese allies. 
One major exception to this was Great Britain. The Japanese-Manchoukuo 
Year Book, 1938, stated that Manchoukuo had a counsellor to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain (See Table IV). As 
Great Britain was one of the major powers supporting the nonrecogni-
tion doctrine, this seems significant and anomalous. 
Diplomatic and consular services of some degree were obviously 
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* Poland + 
Portugal + 
Sweden + 
* U.S.S.R. + 
United States 
*Countries which recognized Manchoukuo 
+Members of the League of Nations at the date shown 
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Source: The China Year Book (1932, reprinted, Kraus-Thomson Organiza-
tion Limited:Nendelin/Liechtenstein, 1969), pp. 781-787; 
the Japan-Mauchoukuo .Year Book 1938 (Tokyo: .The ,Japan-
Manchuokuo Year B9ok:·.compfJ.ny:, 1937), pp. 687-688; the 
Orient Year Book 1942 (Tokyo: Asia Statistics Company, 
1942), p. 540. 
TABLE IV 
MANCHOUKUO'S DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICES ABROAD 
1937 
Embassy in Tokyo 
Consulate General, Keijo, Korea 
Consulate, Blagovestchensk, USSR 
Consulate, Chita USS.R 
Consulate, Shingishu, Korea 
Consulate, Moji,Japan 
Consulate, Osaka, Japan 
Trade Commissioner in Germany 
Trade Commissione~ in.Germany 
+Counselor, Department of Foreign 








Source: The Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book 1938, p. 688; 
The· -Ori:ent· -Year---Book 1942, p. 540. 
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maintained in Manchoukuo, by both recognizing and nonrecognizing powers 
for some time after the League resolution of 1933. Nevertheless, as 
it appears that exequaters were never applied for, the continuance of 
such relations cannnot be taken as an indication of recognition of any 
kind. 
What about the conclusion of trade or commercial agreements 
between two governments? Do such treaties imply mutual recognition? 
Lauterpacht sees commercial relations as signifing de facto recogni-
tion.37 Chen also argues that the conclusion of bilateral treaties, 
including commercial agreements, may imply recognition. 38 The British 
government viewed its trade agreement with Soviet Russia on March 16, 
1921 f . . 39 , as an act o recogn1t1on. However, there seems to be no 
consistency in this area, and many governments who have concluded 
agreements "with new entities, have, nevertheless, insisted that no 
40 recognition had been accorded." 
In trying to determine whether or not a bilateral treaty consti-
tures recognition, it may be useful to consider the subject matter of 
the treaty, and the language used therein to describe the nature of 
the relations between the two participating parties. 41 A "treaty 
regulating, more or less permanently, relations of a general character 
b 11 . f . . 11 42 d etween states usua y const1tutes an act o recogn1t1on, as oppose 
43 to a "termporary local arrangement. However, there does not appear 
to be any clear method of deciding what type of treaty has been con-
eluded. and thus whether or not recognition has occurred. 
It was the question of postal relations and the degree of recog-
nition which these might imply which received the most attention from 
the League of Nations. In February, 1934, a meeting was convened "to 
decide whether members of the Leagueof Nations could make refunds to 
Manchuokuo for carrying its mail through their territory without 
violating the nonrecognition pledge."44 The meeting was prompted by 
the receipt by the General Post Office in London of a letter from 
37 
the Department of Communications of Manchukuo, asking to be supplied 
"with statistics in accordance with the provisions of the Postal Union 
Convention with a view to the liquidation of the transit payments due 
in respect to the mails sent through Manchuria." 45 In May of the same 
year the League reached a decision. on the issue "allowing payment. to 
Manchukuo for transit of mail through Manchuria without legally recon-
nizing Manchukuo."46 It was stipulated that "Manchukuo is not 
entitled to appeal to the Universal Postal Union and that the arrange-
ment is made only between postal administrations, not between govern-
47 ments." Thus, it could be concluded that the League allowed the 
conclusion of bilateral agreements concerning postal arrangements, 
between members and Manchoukuo, but specified that these must not imply 
recognition of any sort. 
Summary 
In conclusion, then, it seems that recognition can be said defin-
itely to have taken place only when a state formally announces that it 
has accorded either de facto or de jure recognition to another state, 
or when a state requests an exequatur with the intention of establish-
ing a consul, thus implying at least de facto recognition. While 
commercial agreements or other bilateral treaties may indicate that 
de facto recognition has taken place, this is not necessarily the case. 
These indications are useful in determining the degree of relations 
38 
which exist between two states. However, unless one state openly 
announces to the international community its acknowledgment of another 
state, recognition cannot be definitely said to have been granted. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NATIONS RECOGNIZING MANCHOUKUO 
Introduction 
Despite the policy of nonrecognition adopted by both the League of 
Nations and the United States, various countries around the world 
accorded recognition to the new state of Manchoukuo between 1932 and 
1941. Such acknowledgment of Manchoukuo was frowned upon by the larger 
Western powers, but the League of Nations as a body did little to 
. d d . 1 repr1man ev1ants. When did some nations recognize Manchoukuo? What 
advantages did they find? What motives influenced their polciy toward 
Manchoukuo? 
Countries Which Allegedly Recognized Manchoukuo 
While it is difficult to produce a definitive list, below, in 
chronological order, are given those countries which are alleged to 
have recognized Manchoukuo either de facto or de jure. What can one 
observe about these countries which may be useful in determining why 
they chose to recognize Manchoukuo? It seems probable that both econo-
mic and political considerations would have influenced policy toward 
Manchoukuo. 
Many of the countries listed were allies of Germany or Japan. 
Thus, it seems possible that their relations with Manchoukuo may have 




COUNTRIES REPORTED TO HAVE RECOGNIZED MANCHOUKUO 
Date of Recognition 
September lSr 1932 
March 3, 1934 
August 16, 1934 
September 2, 1934 
November 29, 1937 
December 2, 1937 
February 20, 1938 
October 19, 1938 
January 9, 1939 
June 1, 1939 
November 30, 1940 
December 4, 1940 
April 14, 1941 
May 14, 1941 
July 18, 1941 
August 1, 1941 
August 1, 1941 
August 2, 1941 
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depressed commercial situation of the 1930's, economic factors were 
probably also present. A third reason could be ideological motives. 
Below are some suggested groupings into which one may put the 
countr~es which recognized Manchoukuo. 
Group A: Japan and its ally Thailand, and the Japanese puppet 
Wang Ching-wei government of·China. 
Group B: Germany and its allies or satellites: Italy, Bulgaria, 
Cro~tia, Denmark, Finland, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. 
Group C: Poland (before Nazi and Soviet occupat.ion), and the 
Vatican. 
Group D: The U.S.S.R. and its pupper state, Outer Mongolia. 
Group E: El Salvador and the Domincan Republic. 
The Political Factor: Groups A and B 
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Most of the countries which recognized Manchoukuo had strong poli-
tical ties to either Germany of Japan, or both. As Japan was responsi-
ble for creating Manchoukuo, and worked persistently for its acceptance 
by other powers, it is not surprising to find that Japan's political 
allies tended to eventually accord recognition to Manchoukuo. Thus, in 
examining relations with Manchoukuo? it is necessary to first study 
relations between the recognizing countries and Japan. 
With the approach of World War II throughout the thirties, Germany 
and Japan grew closer together as allies. Toynbee cites their similar 
positions as "outlaws"from the international community as one of the 
reasons for this mutual sympathy and understanding. 2 While Japan's 
actions in Manchuria indicated a possible threat to German economic and 
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military interests in China, some sections of opinion in Germany thought 
that Germany could benefit from "Japan's policy of 'law and order' in 
Manchuria. "3 With the accession·,df Adolf Hitler and his Nazi government 
to power in 1933, Germany's relations with Japan became more and more 
cordial. The Nazi leaders admired Japan's 11dynamism,"4 and viewed Japan 
as possessing "a crucially strategic position in world affairs."5 
Germany hoped that in the future, Japan would prove a useful ally both 
against the West and against the U.S.S.R. 6 It also hoped that friendly 
relations with Japan might benefit German heavy industry at a later 
date. 7 
In spite of its desire to be on good terms with Japan, Germany did 
not recognize Manchoukuo in 1932, or even after agreeing to a trade pact 
with the state in 1936. 8 When the Manchurian Crisis broke out in 1931, 
the German Foreign Office adopted .a policy of strict neutrality. 9 While 
good relations with Japan were important to Germany, the latter also 
wished to maintain its already good relationship with China, a friend-
ship which Germany had carefully cultivated for ten years. 10 This 
friendship was deepened by the presence in China of German military 
advisors, and the delivery of German war materials to the Chinese. 11 
While these advisors were not sent by the German government, both the 
Chinese and the Japanese interpreted their activities as a sign of 
German support for China. 12 Germany had economic and, to a lesser 
extent, political interests in China and thus did not want to antagonise 
China over Manchoukuo. 13 Germany's entire East Asian policy throughout 
the thirties was to be marked by its desire to maintain friendly rela-
tions with both Japan and China, without upsetting either. 
Germany's policy in East Asia was further complicated by 
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disagreements among German authorities. While the German Foreign Office 
advocated a policy of neutrality, along the lines of the League of 
Nations, 14 the German army pushed for a stronger commitment to China, 
which it viewed as being almost indispensable as a source of raw mater-
ials for German armaments. 15 At the same time, Nazi leaders leaned 
toward a closer understanding with Japan. 16 Thus, the 1931-1939 years 
witnessed an enormous amount of vacillation by Germany as it endeavoured 
to serve its own interests in East Asia, without antagonising anybody, 
and making as few political commitments as possible. 
As already noted, in the early days of the crisis, Germany strove 
to remain neutral. While some events may have indicated a slight 
17 sympathy for Japan, Germany was not willing to upset either the League 
18 of Nations or China by siding with Japan. The German Foreign Office 
19 firmly supported a policy similar to that of the League powers, and 
despite difficulties, this policy continued until 1933. After Germany's 
withdrawal from the League in October, 1933, the need to appease the 
League powers lessened, and in the winter of 1933-1934, the German 
Manchurian Import and Export Company was formed, a move which though not 
according recognition gave some indication of Germany's positive atti-
tude toward Japan's position. 20 On the whole, it was accepted that 
Germany's trade with China was more important than that with either 
21 Japan or Manchoukuo, but it was thought that a trade agreement of some 
sort with Manchoukuo might be beneficial, by (1) helping to readjust 
the imbalance in German-Manchurian trade, which was in the latter's 
22 favour, and (2) appeasing Japan with tacit acknowledgment of Manchou-
kuo. 23 
Japan was so eager to see Manchoukuo recognized by anyone, 
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especially by one of the stronger western powers, that in the opinion 
of Constantin von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, recognition by 
Germany should be "a trump which we are ready to play at the right time 
in the political game."24 China was far too important to Germany, and 
it would have been foolish to antagonize China by prematurely recogniz-
ing Manchoukuo, simply to please Japan, whose full potential as a 
future ally was uncertqin. Thus, the State Secretary to the Foreign 
Office, Bernard von Bulow, said in February, 1934. 
It is not possible at present to opt for Japan when one is 
not sure that she will be the better customer in the. long 
run, and when, on the contrary one definitely knows that 
with such an option one would seriously alie~~te the other 
good customer, China, and possibly lose her. 
Thus, while a trade agreement with Manchoukuo was a definite possibility, 
recognition was something to be withheld for the time being .. 
Accordingly, a German trade mission was dispatched to Manchoukuo 
in 1935 and the following year, the German-Manchoukuoan trade agreement 
. d 26 was s1gne • Under this agreement, German purchases from Manchoukuo 
were to total 100 million Manchoukouan yuan. Three-fourths of the 
payments were to be in Manchoukuoan currency, with the remaining fourth 
in Reichmarks. Manchoukuo was to import German goods worth 25 million 
27 
yuan. German purchases consisted mainly of soya beans, exports of 
which had been declining. 28 The first two years of the agreement were 
not very successful, with Manchoukuo's purchases from Germany falling 
below the stipulated 1:4 ratio. 29 After 1938, however, as Manchoukuo 
began to industralize more, the situation improved somewhat, with 
expanded opportunities for German heavy industry. 3° Competition from 
Japan, however, which produced similar goods, meant that this market 
31 for German heavy industry never became very large. Nevertheless, 
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Germany was willing to endure these economic setbacks. In its quest for 
a closer alliance with Japan, politics were to be placed above economic 
"d t" 32 cons1 era 1ons. 
On November 26, 1936, Germany also concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact 
with Japan, having earlier in the year participated in the Klein-
HAPRO · h Ch" 33 Wh"l h 1 . 1 agreement w1t 1na. 1 e t e atter was a commerc1a agree-
ment, no doubt both countries viewed their respective treaties as 
evidence of a political commitment on the part of Germany. The out-
break of overtSino-Japanesehost~lities in 1937 forced Germany into the 
awkward position which it had so long tried to avoid; that of declaring 
support for one East Asian power over the other. Initially, Germany 
tried to mediate in the conflict34 and bring it to a rapid conclusion, 
fearing that China would be forced to align with the U.S.S.R. if 
f . h . . d 35 d 1 h J ld k f G I "d 1g t1ng cont1nue , an a so t at apan wou as or ermany s a1 
in the dispute, citing the Anti-Comintern Pact. On at least one occas-
sian, Japan implied that its actions in North China was covered by the 
Pact, as Japan was fighting against Chinese Bolshevists. 36 
Germany's first feat was realized in August, 1937, when a Sino-
Russian Non-Aggression Pact was signed. 37 From then on, into 1938, there 
occurred a marked change in Germany's East Asian policy. In December, 
1937, the London Times reported that "German recognition of Manchoukuo 
has been agreed upon in principle."38 Germany's hesitancy was due to 
its desire to remain on good terms with China. 
The German interests in China and the pro-Chinese sentiment 
of large sections of the German public are factors which 
enter into her Far Eastern policy as well as the ideological 
alliance with Japan, and as a matter of course, it is 
desired to avoid pushing China into the arms of Russia. 39 
As fighting in China continued, however, and it seemed as though Japan 
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would win, German policy shifted in favour of Japan. In January, 1938, 
the German Ambassador to China, Herbert von Dirksen, recommended: 
A complete reorientation of German policy in the direction of 
Japan, by the withdrawal of the military advisors from China, 
the total suspension of the deliveries of war material to 
China, the recognition of Manchoukup, and a radical shift 
away from Nationalist China towards the Japanese occupied 
and influenced areas of North China.40 
The worsening of Germany's position in Europe increased the desirability 
of a firmer accord with Japan, even if such a move woul!d offend China. 41 
Good relations with China were still important, but they were over-
42 shadowed by the perceived need to have a stronger alliance with Japan. 
Thus, in February, 1938, Germany announced that formal recognition 
would be accorded to Manchoukuo. 43 On January 17, 1939, Manchoukuo 
accepted an invitation to join the Anti-Comitern Pact with Germany, 
44 Japan, and Italy. 
Similarly, in the case of Italy, relations with Japan influenced 
the Italian attitude toward Manchoukuo. While Italy had not supported 
Japan in the Manchurian Crisis, it did ask for and receive permission 
from Japan, in November, 1936, to establish a Consulate-General at 
45 Mukden, a procedure whiah at least indicated possible de facto recog-
nition. The League of Nations's sanctions against Italy after the 
Ethiopian affair brought Japan and Italy into a similar position 
46 against the League. This growing friendship between Japan and Italy, 
plus the desire of Germany, resulted in Italy's joining the Anti-Com-
intern Pact in November, 1937. 47 Italy's recognition of Manchoukuo 
a few days later, on November 29,1937, was a natural outcome of the 
48 cordial relations which existed between Japan and Italy. The follow-
ing year, a barter agreement was concluded between Italy, Manchoukuo, 
so 
49 and Japan. Various agricultural products were exported to Italy from 
Manchoukuo, in return for which Italy exported industrial commodities 
so to Japan. 
Once Italy and Germany had accorded recognition to Manchoukuo, it 
is not surprising that other Axis states and allies soon followed suit. 
As Japan, Italy, and Germany became closer through the Anti-Comintern 
Pact of November, 1937, Franco Spain began to seek recognition from 
Japan, "through German and Italian Channels with German and Italian 
support."51 Italy and Germany had been the first two powers to recog-
nize the Franco Government in November, 1936, a bare four months after 
the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. 52 On December 1, 1937, over a 
year later, Japan formally recognized the Franco Government. 53 The 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the Spanish and the Man-
choukuoan governments only 24 hours later was obviously a direct result 
of Japan's recognition of Franco Spain. 54 
As German and Italian influence in Europe grew, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, FiQland, Denmark, and Croatia, all granted recogni-
tion to Manchoukuo. Table VI shows that in almost every case, recogni-
tion by German allies or satellites took place after those countries 
had been conquered by Germany. Likewise, countries under Japanese 
influence, including China as represented by the Wang Ching-wei govern-
d Th 1 k 1 d M . 55 ment, an ai and, ac now e ged anchoukuo also. 
While it seems obvious that political alliances between the Axis 
powers were the main factor in their recognition of Manchoukuo, what is 
not so easily understood is why the remaining groups of countries 
mentioned above should have chosen to extend recognition to Manchoukuo. 
Knowing that such a move would bring condemnation from the United States, 
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TABLE VI 
COMPARISON OF DATES OF OCCUPATION BY OR ALLIANCES 
WITH GERMANY, AND DATES OF RECOGNITION 
Dates of Occupation 
November 22, 1938. 
Czechoslovakia grants autonomy to 
Slovakia and Ruthenia. 
March 15, 1939. Germany invades 
Czechoslovakia, and makes Slovakia 
a separate state. 
September 1,1939. Germany invades 
Poland. 
April 9, 1940. Germany invades 
Denmark. 
October 7, 1940. Hungary joins 
the Axis. 
November 23, 1940. Romania joins 
the Axis. 
March 1, 1941. Bulgaria jpins 
the Axis. 
April 6, 1941. Germany invades 
Yugoslavia. Croatia declared 
independent. 
June 22, 1941. Finland joins 
Germany attack on the U.S.S.R. 
Dates of Recognition 
October 19, 1938. Poland 
recognizes Manchoukuo 
January 9, 1939. Hungary 
recognizes Manchoukuo. 
July 1, 1939. Slovakia 
recognizes Manchoukuo. 
December 4, 1940. Romania 
recognizes Manchoukuo. 
June 14, 1941. Bulgaria 
recognizes Manchoukuo. 
July 18, 1941. Finland 
recognizes Manchoukuo. 
August 1, 1941. Denmark 
recognizes Manchoukuo. 
August 2, 1941. Croatia 
recognizes Manchoukuo. 
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France, Great Britain, and the smaller League powers, what incentive was 
strong enough to prompt these countries to acknowledge the new state? 
The Ideological Factor: ·The Vatican 
In the case of the Vatican, it appears that ideology may have been 
a pertinent factor. The Vatican is reported by some Japanese sources 
to have recognized Manchoukuo on September 2, 1934. 56 According to an-
other entry in the Japan Year Book, relations between the Vatican and 
Manchoukuo began on April 18, 1934, when: 
the Holy See notified the Manchoukuo Government of its deci-
sion to form a separate mission field in Manchoukuo, inde-
pendent from that of China, and appointed the Rt. Rev. Bishop 
A. GAspais as Acting Apostolic Delegate in Manchoukup. This 
notice • • • was confirmed in Augu'st of the same year by an 
official communicationfromHis Eminence Pierre Cardinal 
Fumasoni-Biondi, prefet de la S. Congregation de la Propa-
gande. At the same time, His Eminence in his communication 
to the Manchoukup Foreign Minister stated that the Catholic 
missions in Manchoukuo would gladly contribute to the moral 
and intellectual development of the country according to the 
disposition of the Manchoukuo authorities.57 
It is possible that the August and the September dates refer to the same 
incident. Whatever the case, it seems obvious that relations of some 
degree certainly did exist between the Holy See and the Manchoukuo 
government at this stage. There is also a record of a diplomatic mis-
sion from Manchoukuo to the Pope in 1938. 58 What underlay this 
acknowledgment of Manchoukuo on the part of the Vatican? 
According to one source, the Vatican's recognition of Manchoukuo 
may have been part of the war it was waging against communism. 59 The 
Vatican hoped that Japan would act as a deterrent to Russia, and thus 
regarded the former's action in Manchuria favorably, pleased with the 
J k d t d . . . d 60 way apan wor e o wee out commun1sm 1n occup1e areas. "In the 
eyes of the Catholic Church, Japan was to be the Germany of the East, 
the destroyer of Bolshevism in Asia and the mortal enemy of Soviet 
Russia."61 
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The Vatican may also have been concerned about ·the-safety of Roman 
Catholics living in Japan and Manchoukuo. In 1933, the number of 
Catholics living in both areas was substantial as shown in Table VII. 
From 1931 onwards, relations between the Vatican and Japan improved 
considerably. 
The Economic Factor: Poland 
The first.non-Axis country in Europe to recognize Manchoukuo was 
62 Poland on October 19, 1938. . As early as 1934, reports had circulated 
. 65 
that Poland was a~ready prepared to recognize the new state. Accord-
ing to the New York Times, the Polish Minister to Japan went to Man-
choukuo in March, 1934 "to study the situation in Manchoukuo in con-
nection with the Polish Government's intention to recognize the new 
state."64 The Minister said tht Poland would "probably recognize 
Manchoukuo before Germany,".which was currently examining the commercial 
situation in Manchoukuo. 65 
It was not until four years later, however, ·that recognition of 
any kind was anounced by Poland. What caused the delay? Later in 1934, 
Poland entered into a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R., 66 due to 
fear of Germany, and thus may have felt that recognition of Manchoukuo, 
a pro-Japanese move, would offend the U.S.S.R •• Whatever the reason, 
it was not until July 30, 1938, that the question of Polish recognition 
of Manchoukuo was raised in public again, when it was reported that 
Poland was seeking "a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation" with 
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Polish recognition of Manchoukuo was announced, while the treaty pro-
vided for "the direct accrediting of consular officals and the furthe-
ance of trade."69 
The hope of new markets for Polish goods seems the most obvious. 
reason for these actions. In 1936 and 1937, Polish trade with Manchou-
k . 11 . t 71 uo was v1rtua y non-ex1sten • According to the 1943 Manchoukuo 
Year Book however, Poland's trade with Manchoukuo did not increase 
substantially after the Treaty of Amity was signed, and Poland was 
never listed as a principal country in Manchoukuo's foreign trade. 72 
Thus, if the hope of new trade was what. prompted Poland's recognition 
of Manchoukuo, Poland must have been sorely disappointed. 
Since Poland was conquered and. partitioned by Germany and the 
U.S.S.R. less than a year after Poland recognized Manchoukuo, it 
seems possible that Polish policy toward Manchoukuo, and hence toward 
Japan, may have been prompted by Polish fear of either Germany or 
Russia. However, there is no evidene of a Polish-Japanese alignment 
of any sort of this time. If this was Poland's plan, the events of 
1939 demonstrated its failure. 
The Political Factor: The Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union, not being a member of the League of Nations at 
the time of the Manchurian Crisis, was not bound by the Leagues' 
resolution of nonrecognition. It had been invited along with the 
United States to aid the League in its efforts to resolve the situation 
in East Asia, 73 but refused on the grounds that, as Russia was not a 
member of the League, it could have no influence when it came to making 
74 decisions concerning the matter. Moreover, it was felt that as ''the 
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majority of the states forming part of the Advisory Committee were not 
maintaining relations with the Soviet Union and therefore_showed signs 
f f dl d · d h S · U · "75 · o an un rien y isposit1on towar s t e ov1et n1on, 1t was not 
possible for Russia to work with the committee. The Soviet Union did, 
however, suggest that it would abide by any proposal which would pro-
76 
vide a just solution to the problem. 
When the Manchurian Crisis broke out, Soviet-Japanese relations 
were fairly cordial, 77 but the U.S.S.R. was isolated politically and in 
. . . h 78 no pos1t1on to go to war w1t anyone. Initially the U.S.S.R. sought 
assurances that hostilities would not spread to North Manchuria, where 
the U.S.S.R. held the Chinese Eastern Railway, but when Japanese forces 
took Harbin and Tsitsihar in late 1931, early 1932, Russia resigned 
herself to the situation. 79 Thus, while the Soviet government must have 
been alarmed by this threat to what was an important sphere of interest 
for Russia, it decided to adopt a realistic policy to the affair, 
80 realizing that it could not challenge Japan. 
Instead, the Scivi.et Union pursued a concilinatory policy, suggest-
81 ing a non-aggression pact with Japan as early as December, 1951. 
Even when it was proposed that the Soviet Union would recognize Man-
82 choukuo in return for such a pact, however, Japan refused. In view 
of Japan's desire to see Manchoukuo recognized, this refusal appears 
strange, but, apparently, the Japanese military were opposed to any 
such alliance on the ideological grounds that Japan should not become 
"linked with such a completely different policy as that of the U.S.S.R. 1183 
A second reason was Japan's wish not to appear pro-communist before the 
world. 84 
Despite this refusal, however, and in spite of continuing Russo-
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Japanese friction over border disputes between Manchoukuo and the Soviet 
puppet state of Outer Mongolia, the Soviet Union decided to follow a 
policy of practiculity with regard to Manchoukuo, and from 1932 onwards 
can certainly be said to have accorded her at least de facto recognition. 
As early as May, 1932, the U.S.S.R. agreed to the stationing of Man-
choukuoan consuls at China, Blagoveschensk, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok. 85 
July, 1933 brought a Soviet offer to sell the Chinese Eastern 
Railway to Manchoukuo. 86 The first sentence of the offer read, "The 
government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to sell to the state of Manchoukuo 
all property relating to the Chinese Eastern."87 This language was 
interpreted by some as constituting de facto recognition of the new 
88 state. 
In the London Times of December, 1934, there appeared a brief 
account of the signing of the Soviet-Manchoukuo Rivers Navigation 
Treaty. 89 After the conclusion of the terms of the sale of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway in March, 1955, 90 Japan claimed that the Soviet Union 
could be said to have recognized Manchoukuo de jure. 91 The U.S.S.R. 
continued to deny this~ but Soviet dealings with Manchoukuo certainly 
imply at least de facto recognition. 
In 1939, Russo-Japaneserel~tions took a decided turn for the worse 
over the issue of the Manchoukuo-Mongolia border. Japan wished to 
broaden Manchoukuo's frontiers, thus infringing on Outer Mongolia. 
From May through September, conflicts occurred on the border almost 
daily between Japanese and Soviet forces in what was practically an 
undeclared war. It was not until the signing of the Russo-Japanese 
Pact of Neutrality in April 1941 that these hostilities finally carne to 
an end, and the Soviet Union also agreed to respect "the territorial 
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integrity and inviolability of the Empire of Manchoukuo" in return for 
better relations with Japan. 92 
Thus, like Germany and Italy, the Soviet Union's attitude toward 
Manchoukuo was largely dictated by its relations with Japan, and by the 
Soviet decision to accept what it could not change to follow a practical 
policy of conciliation toward Japan, and to interact with Manchoukuo 
long before any other major power even considered recognition. 95 Russia 
having formally recognized the new state in 1941, recognition by Outer 
Mongolia, its puppet state, soon followed. 
Group E: El Salvador and the 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador and the Dominican Republic fall into a category of 
their own. They were the only American countries said to have recog-
nized Manchoukuo, but confusing accounts of this alleged recognition 
exist for both countries. 
In May, 1934, El Salvador achieved the dubious honor of being the 
first country, after Japan, to extend de jure recognition to Manchou-
94 kuo. A month earlier, according to a report in the New York Times, 
the Japanese consul in San Salvador had suggested that Salvador might 
benefit from such a move. 95 Yet, on May 21, 1934, it was revealed that 
Salvador had, in fact, already accorded recognition to Manchoukuo on 
96 March 3 of that year. No reason for the delay in announcing recogni-
tion was forthcoming. In correspondence with the League of Nations, 
El Salvador explained that on receiving news of the enthronement of the 
Manchoukuoan emperor, it had expressed its "fevrent good wishes for the 
personal happiness of Bis Majesty Pu Yi, and for the peace and prosperity 
59 
of the Manchu Empire."97 Salvador had also mentioned its desire that 
"the most friendly relations would always prevail between the two 
. n98 countr1es. 
The reasons which have traditionally been given for this move on 
the part of El Salvador have been commercial; that Salvador hoped to 
k f . ff b . . . 99 secure new mar ets or 1ts co ee y grant1ng recogn1t1on. The idea 
that Salavador may have been hoped for a new coffee market is plausible, 
although there is no evidence that its coffee exports to either Japan 
or Manchouku0 increased substantially as a result of recognition. 100 
Moreover, as late· as 1938, four years after recognition, Manchoukuo 
was still merely talking about the'possibility of a treaty "of commerce 
and friendship with El Salvador."101 Furthermore, it was not until 
1939 that Salvador announced that it would appoint an honorary consul 
in Manchoukuo. 102 
Confusion continues to exist over the question of why, if El Salvador 
had indeed extended recognition to Manchoukuo in March, 1934, it was 
not announced until May of that year? The New York Times of February 
17, 1935, suggested that El Salvador had somehow inadvertently recognized 
Manchoukuo, by replying to the announcement of the Emperor Pu Yi's en-
thronement.103 "There is opinion to the effect that the message from 
the Foreign Office of Manchoukuo was answered • • • without any reali-
zation that it meant recognition of the Manchoukuo government.11104 
Considering Japan's eagerness to have Manchoukuo recognized by other 
governments, one wonders why there was a two-month delay in communicat-
ing the news of recognition by Salvador. Perhaps, Salvador threatened 
to withdraw its tacit recognition unless Japan promised to expand its 
coffee imports, but no published evidence of that has been found. 
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The alleged recognition of Manchoukuo by the Dominican Republic 
is characterized by even greater uncertainty. Like El Salvador, the 
Dominican Republic replied to the news of the Emperor's ascension to the 
' 934105 d "d throne by sending a note in August, 1 which expresse a esire 
to increase the friendly relations existing between the Dominican 
Republic and Manchoukuo."106 Despite a report in the December New York 
Times that Manchoukuoan officials were hoping that the note might be a 
prelude to recognition ,107 it was. not ~ntil January, 1935 that the note 
108 was answered, and the Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book of 1934 made no refer-
ence to the incident. 109 One wonders why officials in Manchoukuo waited 
five months to reply considering how eager they were for any kind of 
recognition. As in the case of El Salvador, there is no clear answer. 
It was not until four years later, in 1937, that the question of 
recognition by the Dominican Republic cropped up again. In the Japan 
Year Book for that year, the following paragraph appeared: 
Diplomatic relations with Dom!bnica: On August 16, 1934, the 
President of Dominica presented his autograph letter to the 
Emperor of Manchoukuo through the Foreign Office of ,that 
country, in return for which the Emperor sent his dated 
January 1, 1935 to the President. The Foreign Minister 
of the Republic therefore sent a letter of appreciation 
to the Emperor through the Foreign Office of Manchoukuo, 
and in this manner diplomatic relations between the two 
countries have been established.110 
According ~o this account, then, recognition of some sort had been 
granted in 1934-1935. But a letter in the December 6, 1937 issue of 
the London Times, contradicted all this. The Charge d'Affaires of the 
Dominican Republic in London wrote to the editor objecting to a report 
in the Times a few days earlier, which included the Dominican Republic 
in a list of countries which had recognized Manchoukuo. 111 He stated: 
that the Dominican~ Republic as.a_ member_of the League of 
Nations has never broken away from the League; consequently, 
all reports that it has recognized Manchoukuo are with-
out foundation. The Dominican Republic has always been 
faithful to the principles and aims of the League of 
Nations .112 
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Furthermore, in the Manchoukuo Year Book of 1943, the Dominican Republic 
is not included in a list of countries which had recognized Manchoukuo 
d . 113 e JUre. Thus, while de facto recognition may have been implied in 
the notes of 1934-1935, it appears that de jure recognition was never 
accorded. 
Summary and Discussion 
Despite the fact that most of the countries which recognized Man-
choukuowere members or former members of the League of Nations, and 
had voted for the League resolution of February, 1935, which committed 
League members not to recognize Manchoukuo~ the League of Nations never 
made any attempt to discipline the violators of that resolution. 114 
Only in the case of the first offender, El Salvador, did the 
League engage in any discussion of the issue. Even then, no penalty of 
any sort was imposed on Salvador. A few days after it was reported that 
El Salvador had recognized Manchoukuo, in May, 1934, the New York Times, 
reporting from Geneva, suggested that the League of Nations was possibly 
considering "what action to take against El Salvador for recognizing 
llS Manchoukuo." The report noted that Salvador's delegate to the 
LeagueAssembly on the Manchurian incident had not been present at the 
t . f th d . h . . 1 . 116 1me o e vote on a opt1ng t e nonrecogn1t1on reso ut1on. Later 
when the Secretary General of the League circulated notices to all 
League members informing them of the League policy toward Manchoukuo, 
El S 1 d h d b f h f . d' 117 Th a va or a een one o t e ew countr1es not respon 1ng. e 
opinion of most League officials in Geneva, however, was that Salvador 
62 
was nevertheless bound by the League resolutions, and that its violation 
of the resolution constituted possible grounds for expulsion from the 
118 
League. 
In the July, 1934, edition of The Monthly Summary of the League of 
Nations, however, there was no mention of any possible expulsion of 
Salvador. Instead, the Summary simply reported that in response to the 
Secretary General's request, Salvador had furnished details of its 
0 0 f M h k 119 Th t 0 f . . 1 recogn1t1on o anc ou uo. ere was no men 10n o 1mpos1ng pena -
ities on El Salvador, or of passing any moral-judgment on the actions 
of the Salvadorean. government. 
Similarly, in the case of other League.members which recognized 
Manchoukuo, the League maden~'protest of any kind. Table VIII compares 
the dates on which some countries announced their withdrawal from the 
League, with the dates on which they accorded recognition to Manchoukuo. 
Despite that fact that both Italy and Hungary were still League 
members when they announced that they would recognize Manchoukuo, the 
League Summaries for t.he relevant dates record no objections on the part 
ofthe?League of Nations. While it would have been difficult for the 
League to have taken any punitive action against recognizing countries, 
it seems strange that not even a verbal condemnation was entered into 
the League record. Far from criticising acts of recognition of Man-
choukuo, TheMonthly Summary of the League of Nations for the pertinent 
dates does not mention these at all. It was this flaccid behavior on 
the part of the League of Nations, making decisions and resolutions 
which it could not, or would not, implement, which was to lead to its 
inefficacy as an international body of arbitration. 
TABLE VIII 
COMPARISON OF DATES OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE 
LEAGUE AND RECOGNITION OF MANCHOUKUO 
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Date of Recognition Country Announced Wi thdrawal-l~ 
1934 3 3 El Salvador 
1937 11 29 Italy 
1937 12 2 Spain 
1938 2 20 Germany 
1939 1 11 Hungary 
1941 4 ll~ **U.S.S.R. 
*Formal withdrawal took place two years after 
-lH~Russia was, in fact, expelled form the League 
its admission in September, 1934. 
this 
five 
1937 7 26 
1937 12 11 
1939 5 8 
1933 10 31 
1939 4 11 
1939 12 14 
initial date. 
years after 
Source: The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations. (October, 1933; 
August, December, 1937; April, May, December, 1939). 
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CHAPTER V 
NATIONS NOT RECOGNIZING MANCHUOKUO 
Introduction 
The League of Nations' resolution of March 11, 1932, stated that 
the League would not recognize any situation in East Asia brought about 
by force. The final report on the Manchurian affair, adopted by the 
Assembly in February, 1933, reiterated this policy of nonrecognition 
Most League members upheld his policy throughout Manchoukuo's existence. 
The United States, which published its own statement of nonrecognition 
early in 1932, and worked in cooperation with the League Advisory Com-
mittee in the dispute, also refused to recognize Manchoukuo. 
Why were there countries so adamantly opposed to the recognition 
of Manchoukuo? It is true that many were signatories of either the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact1 or the Nine Power Treaty. 2 All except the United 
States were members of the League of Nations, and thus had a certain 
commitment to uphold its decisions and its covenant. Yet many of the 
countries which did recognize Manchoukuo were parties to these agree-
ments also, but chose to ignore them. 
Why did some countries refuse to abandon the League policy of non-
recognition? Acceptance of the new state might have benefited them 
commercially, and would certainly have gained them favour with Japan. 
As Japan had become a major power, this latter consideration was not 
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unimportant, especially when one considers how the eventual outbreak of 
war anticipated throughout this period. Why, then, was recognition now 
accorded? 
Countries Which Did Not Recognize Manchoukuo 
As in the case of countries which recognized Manchoukuo, below are 
some suggested categories into which the nonrecognizing countries may 
be placed. 
Group A. Great Britain, France, and the United States. Three of 
the traditionally great powers of the West. The former two were also 
founding members of the League of Nations. 
Group B. The smaller powers of the League. 
Group C. Countries which eventually came under Axis rule: Austria, 
Belgium, Netherlands, and Norway. 
Group A: The Great Powers 
The policy of each of the great powers was hampered by conflicting 
interests. While all wished, or felt obliged, to uphold a certain amount 
of moral justice in the Manchurian affair, which might involve discip-
lining Japan~ all three had interests in East Asia, and closer to home, 
which limited their freedom to take a harsh policy against Japan. All 
tried to find a middle policy that would demonstrate concern over the 
incident, but would not require any military or financial risk. 
Great Britain. As one of the two major powers of the League, and 
a founding member also, Great Britain felt, to some extent, simply 
obliged to uphold the decisions of the League. 3 However, the summer 
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and fall of 1931 had been a period of domestic instability in Great 
Britain, with the collapse of the Labor Government under Ramsay Mac-
Donald and formation of a National Coalition Government, also under 
4 MacDonald. This split the Labor party and put the government in the 
hands of the Conservatives. 5 On September 21, the very day that China 
appealed to the League of Nations, Britain went off the gold standard. 6 
Six days earlier, the British fleet at Invergordon had mutinied. 7 
Small wonder then, that Britain was not ready to pay much atten-
tion to an incident in Manchuria. Its initial reaction was to avoid 
entanglements at all cost. Immediate reports of the incident were con-
fusing, and Great Britain feared that whatever view it expressed would 
offend either Japan or China. Thus, a cautious policy of neutrality 
8 emerged. Great Britain sincerely hoped for a peaceful solution to the 
dispute, involving no punitive action against either Japan or Ching. 
As one of the major powers, Britain knew that any such disciplinary 
action would naturally involve it, and would not be without repercussions. 
Great-Brit-ain. then, hoped to resolve the problem through the League 
of Nations, in some collective policy with the other League members, 9 
and possibly with the United States as we11. 10 Yet, Britain was not 
overly pleased with the policy of nonrecognition suggested by Henry H. 
Stimson, the American Secretary of State, early in 1932. 11 Unlike the 
United States, Great Britain had no ,tradition of a nonrecognition policy. 
in East Asia. In response to Stimson's suggestion of such a policy in 
January,l932, Britain stated that as long as the Open Door policy was 
maintained in East Asia, it saw no need for a nonrecognition policy. 12 
Like the other large powers which had some interests in the dispute 
Britain opposed any action "which would only inflame Japanese feelings 
74 
d . d . . 11 13 an precip1tate a angerous s1tuat1on. Britain had various commer-
cial and territorial concerns in Asia and did not want Japan to gain an 
14 undue advantage there. Rather than prompting Great Britain to take 
a firmer stand toward Japan's actions in Manchuria, however, this factor 
instead provoked a policy of appeasement toward Japan. Having neither 
the inclination nor the resources to protect its interests in East Asia, 
Britain shrank from any intervention which might antagonize Japan and 
put British interests in Asia at greater risk. 15 This concern over 
British interests in East Asia did not go unnoticed by Japan, which was 
willing to "respect the position of Great Britain'' in such areas as 
"Shanghai, Canton, and other places along the Yangtze River and South 
China."16 Britain's willingness to accept Japan's early 1932 promise 
to maintain the Open Door in Manchuria indicated a hope of preserving 
British rights and interests in China through a conciliatory policy 
17 toward Japan. 
Moreover, at least until the attack on Shanghai in January, 1932, 
Britain sympathized with Japan's claims to a special position in 
Manchuria. In the words of an analogy used by some British officials 
throughout the affair, "the League had no more business in Manchuria 
than it·would have had in Il'ldia."18 Indeed, "it was upon the basis 
of common imperialistic interests that Japan expected to develop coop-
eration with Great Britain in China."19 
At the same time, Britain had to remember its friendship with the 
United States, which condemned Japan's action in Manchoutuo. According 
to one source, the Anglo-American friendship was so important to Great 
Britain that it greatly influenced British policy in the affair, 
20 Britain was not a "free agent," but had to "keep in with the United 
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States on account of the War Debts question."21 There was also a further 
need to maintain good terms with the United States, for, if further 
fighting occurred in the East, Britain was.r.not at all sure of its 
ability to defend its interests there, and so would have to call on the 
United States for help. 22 
British policy, then, wa,s dictated by her need to placate both the 
Japanese and the Americans who were on opposing sides. Yet by pursuing 
a middle path, adopting nonregonition in accordance with the League and 
the United States, while still maintaining the need to conciliate Japan 
d f . f . B . . 1 d · h 'd 23 an re us1ng to en orce sanct1ons, r1ta1n p ease ne1t er s1 e. 
The British nonrecognition policy was adopted along with the rest 
of the League ina collective decision and Britain never wavered from it. 
Yet, Great Britain constantly, until the late 1930's, tried to mend its 
relations with Japan. There were suggestions that it would have been 
willing to drop nonrecognition if the United States led the way. 
According to a report in the New York Times of March 5, 1934, London 
officials said that it ,was "only a matter of time before the present 
policy ••• [would] be modified."24 A second report a few days later 
reiterated this view, and added that Britain expected recognition to 
eventually come from Washington also. According to the article, there 
were "various unconfirmed rumors to the effect that this is on the 
1125 cards. 
Throughout 1934, feelers were. put out about the possibility of 
renewing the old Anglo-Japanese alliance with a nonaggression pact of 
k . d 26 some 1n • At about the same time, the Federation of British Indus-
tries sent a trade mission to Manchoukuo to examine ways of furthering 
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British commercial interests there. 27 These two moves were inevitably 
linked by many observers, despite efforts by British officials to 
"emphasize that the sending of a trade mission had no connection what-
ever with political matters, and 
choukuo is still impossible."28 
that British recognition of Man-
China protested the mission, charging that Lord Barnby, the 
Chairman, had implied that Britain should recognize Manchoukuo. 29 China 
also argued that, even without formal recognition, the sending of the 
trade mission violated the League resolution of February, 1933, which 
"implied that neither political nor economic relations should be 
. 30 
established with the state set up by Japan." When the mission returned 
in December, 1934, it was expected that it would "advocate immediate 
recognition of Manchukuo • • • point to the opportunities for British 
trade in the Manchurian market, and ••• urge the government to remain 
on the best possible terms with Japan."31 While the trade mission did 
not go that far, it did strongly encourage British businesses to become 
involved in the "development of a new Japanese empire on the mainland 
of Asia,"32 and stressed the importance of good Anglo-Japanese rela-
tions. "33 The proposals of the trade mission w:ere never taken up, how-
ever, and the idea of an Anglo-Japanese nonaggression pact was also aban-
doned.34 
While the non-political nature of the Federation of British Indus-
tries' trade mission was continually stressed, there was another British 
commercial mission underway in China in the fall of 1934. Sir Frederick 
Leith Ross led a one-person mission whi(h was definitely political in some 
f . . . . 34 o 1ts act1v1t1es. China was then in the process of switching from 
an economy based on the pure silver standard, to a paper currenty, and 
36 
required help from the other powers in implementing this change. 
Britain sent Leith-Ross to advise the Chinese and to advance British 
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interests. He was also to endeavour to bring about a reconciliation 
37 between the Chinese and the Japanese. . His recommendations included 
the possible recognition of Manchoukuo. 38 
The work of the Leith-Ross mission was not viewed favorably in 
Japan, and it produced few results in the long run. 39 In 1936-1937, how-
ever, there was renewed discussion ofanew Anglo-Japanese alliance, 
h . • J 1 • • • • 40 t 1s t1me at apan s 1n1t1at1ve. While these proposals came to 
nothing, they demonstrated a desire on both sides in those years to re-
new the old Anglo-Japanese friendship. 
Like most of the other Western powers which refused recognition to 
Manchoukuo, Britain nevertheless retained consular representatives in 
41 the new state. As noted earlier, this need not imply recognition. 
On the question of consular representation, Sir John Simon, the British 
foreign secretary, stated: "No question of recognition by his Majesty's 
government of the existing regime in Manchuria has been involved in these 
relations."42 
France. Being a major League power like Great Britain, France also 
was morally obliged to uphold any resolut.ion of the League. And, like 
Britain, France was beset with many domestic and European problems in 
1931 and so was willing to abide by any League decision which did not 
. h . 43 requ1re muc act1on. As in most other matters, France's attitude 
toward the League was dominated by the French view of Germany. The 
French were interested in the League chiefly as an instrument for holding 
44 Germany at bay. As a peace-keeping body for settling otherdisputes 
in the world, the League was of little interest to France. Thus, while 
78 
France was willing enough to uphold a policy of nonrecognition which in-
valved no tangible cost, it was not ready to participate in imposing 
45 
sanctions on any one. 
A further reason for its commitment to the League of Nations was 
France's desire to stay on good terms with both Great Britain and the 
United States, which it wanted as allies in the event of another war 
46 with Germany. Although France had some sympathy for Japan in the 
Crisis, 47 and although Japan approached the French early in 1932, seek-
ing some kind of alliance, France tried to remain neutral in East Asia. 48 
With regard to a possible France-Japanese alliance, the official 
approached was instructed toJ"evade the offer courteously • taking 
care not to leave any tracewhich1could make our .attitude toward the 
League of Nations of the signatories of the Treaty of Washington appear 
ambiguous."49 France could not afford to "compromise her relations 
with Britain and the United States, which she considered fundamental, 
b F E · h · h f d · h "so y ar astern quest1ons w 1c were o secon ary 1mportance to er. 
Nevertheless, France did not want to antagonize Japan for fear of en-
dangering its Asian possessios, and so accepted the nonrecognition 
51 policy while remaining very sympathetic toward Japan. 
France did however have a substantial commercial interest in Man-
choukuo. This may have been due to a deliberate policy on the part of 
Japan to encourage French investment in Manchuria, and so win French 
t f J ' 1· . . Ch' 52 suppor or apan s po 1c1es 1n 1na. As early as March, 1933, 
barely amonth after the report on the dispute had been adopted in the 
League Assembly, the New York Times ran an article entitled, "French 
Flirting With Manchukuo," which reported on the apparent interest of 
French financial groups in Manchoukuo. 53 
According to the article, this move was receiving "considerable 
attention from the press, as an indication of the friendly attitude 
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of France, and as a possible forerunner of recognition."54 By July, the 
Tokyo France-Japanese Association was formed, by "French and Japanese 
financial interests to make investments in the new state of Manchoukuo."55 
Throughout 1934 there were conflicting reports on whether or not any 
French investments had been made. 56 However, French trade with Manch-
oukuo was never very important and is not even mentioned in many ·J1an-
57 choukuoan sources. 
The United States. The United States was never a member of the 
League of Nations. Despite this, and despite its unwillingness to 
become involved in the League's actions concerning Manchuria, the United 
States found itself playing a major role in the negotiations and 
decision-making. The United States originated the policy of nonregon-
nition which the League eventually adopted toward Manchuria. Thus, 
the motivation of the United Sta.tes and its participation in the affair 
are of particular importance. 
Like France and Great Britain, when the crisis began in September, 
1931, the United States was facing many other problems of a more 
urgent nature. Because of the world-wide depression, the American 
economy was continually worsening and unemployment was rising. Elec-
tions of the preceding November had resulted in a split congress, 
which not only worried President Herbert Hoover about his'chances of 
re-election in 1932, but, more importantly, made it virtually impossible 
for him to put through policies which might help redeem the economic 
situation. 58 Besides this, isolationism was still a dominant philosophy 
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in the United States, and it would take an important cause, plus a 
strong president, to presuade isolationists in either party of the need 
to become more involved in world affairs. 
On September 19,1931, barely 26 hours after the explosion in 
Mukden, 59 the incident was brought before the League of Nations by the 
Chinese representative there, Mr. Sze. 60 On the assurance of the 
Japanese representative that his government was doing everything possible 
to resolve the situation, the Council brought the discussion to a 
61 close. Meanwhile, in the United States, Secretary of State Henry H. 
Stimson, while not unduly worried about the affair, did contact the 
JapaneseAmbassador, Debuchi.Katsuji, and ask him to cancel his triennial 
62 leave. . That the United Stat~s was initially not too concerned by the 
affair, or at least that it did not expect to play a large role can be 
seen in a State Department press release stating that the United States 
"saw no reason to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a means of preserv-
. 63 
ing peace between the Japanese and Chinese governments." 
On the third day of the dispute, however, China again brought the 
matter before the LeagueCouncil, this time citing Article 11 of the 
64 
Covenant. At the same time, China appealed to the United States 
· under the:. Kellogg-Briand Pact. 65 China asked that the United States 
"take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far 
East and the upholding ofthe.principle of peaceful settlement of 
· · 1 d · "66 A d · - S · h 6 7 h h · 1nternat1ona 1sputes. ccor 1ng to m1t , owever, t lS note was 
never answered, and Stimson, in his work on the affair, does not 
mention it either. 68 The State Department was opposed to invoking the 
Kellogg Pact, for fear that such a move would needlessly provoke the 
more volatile groups in Japan by appearingto place the blame on Japan 
69 as the aggressor. 
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The United States was willing to consider some sort of action under 
the Nine Power Pact, and communicated this to Geneva, where much 
emphasis was being placed on the position that the United States might 
take in the crisis. In the words of a New York Times reporter on 
September 21, "There is a strong desire ••• to know that the Council 
can count on at least the moral support of the United States 
expressions of American opinion, official, public, and press are 
awaited eagerly."70 
• and 
Onthewhole, however, the United States was willing to let the 
League of Nations go ahead in its discssions, and hoped that a solution 
would be found there. The resolution of the September 22 meeting of the 
League called for withdrawal of both Chinese and Japanese troops from 
the territory of the other, and also recommended that the United States, 
as a party having much interest in the area, be advised of all the 
L . h ff . 71 I 1 h' s . I eague reports concern1ng t e a a1r. n rep y to t 1s, t1mson s 
note of September 24 assured the League of the sympathy and agreement 
of the United States regarding the League resolution. 72 The resolution 
of September 30, which embodied virtually the same recommendations con-
cerning the withdrawal of troops, also met with a positive reaction 
from the United States. 73 
Despite this affirmationof support for the League, the United 
States made no immediate steps toward any decisive action in arbitrat-
ing the crisis. It was not until after news of the bombing of Chinchow 
had been received on October 8, 1931, that the United States began to 
come out more clearly on the side of the League. Stimson decided that 
failure on the part of the United States to support the League might 
82 
prevent the League from finding a solution to the problem. Thus, while 
he still tried to develop "his policy according to the 'independent 
judgment' of the United States government,"74 he "also tried to give 
all possible and practical cooperation to the peace machinery which was 
attempting to bring peace."75 
Delighted by this sign of support from the United States, the 
president of the Council, Aristide Birandof France, suggested that the 
United States be invited to participateintCouncil discussions. 76 This 
was strongly opposed by the Japanese representative. 77 Nevertheless, 
the proposal was adopted on October 16 and Prentiss Gilbert, the 
American Consul at Geneva, immediately took a place at the Council 
table. 78 The excitment of the Council at the presence of an American 
delegate soon cooled, however, as it became evident that the United 
States was again, despite the assurances of previous notes and the 
appointment of Gilbert, unprepared to ..::ommit itself to the kind of sup-
port that the League was looking for. 
After his dampening first speech to the Council when he declared 
that the United States was "not in a position to participate with the 
members of the council in the formulation of any action envisaged 
under that instrument [that is, th~ Covenant]."79 Gilbert made 
1 t, t · bl' · 80 Th' h dl h f 11 on y wo sta ements 1n pu 1c meet1ngs. 1s. was ar y t e u -
fledged support that the Council had hoped for. The United States, 
while hopeful that the League would find a peaceful solution to the 
dispute, feared possible war with Japan, especially if the League took 
economic sanctions against Japan. Gilbert was given very little 
power of negotiation, and his presence at the Council had very little 
effect. 81 
83 
These conflicting aims on the part of the United States eventually 
led to its adopting a policy of nonrecognition. While the United 
States on the one hand supported the League's efforts to mediate in the 
situation, and was genuinely concerned about Japan's activities in the 
East, it was afraid of the military and economic risks involved in 
blocking Japan's aggressive path. 82 Thus, the United States had to find 
a middle ground of some sort, a policy which would express disapproval 
of Japan's actions and block any new political or territorial expansion. 
but would, at the same time, not involve any military or economic 
83 cost. 
If fighting had ended in the fall of 1931, despite the infringe-
ments of the Japanese on Chinese territory, it is possible that the 
United States and the League might have been prepared to let the matter 
drop. With the attack on Chinchow, however, in early 1932, the situa-
tion could no longer be ignored. On January 7, 1932, Stimson published 
the subsequently famous nonrecognition note. For Stimson. wanting to 
take some sort of action against Japanese aggression, but knowing that 
economic and military sanctions would·never be invoked, the non recogni-
tion policy was to be a "substitute which would carry the force and 
implications of a moral condemnation. 1184 
In addition, Stimson hoped that such a note might "serve as a 
rallying point for the other nations and as 'the substitute for sanc-
tions for which we all [have] been groping.'"85 Accordingly, 
Stimson made out a draft of the nonrecognition note which was 
explained to both the French and British ambassadors. The United States 
especially hoped for the cooperation of Great Britain, realising the 
latter's great financial interests in China. 86 The British, however, 
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saw no need for such a note as long as the Open Door policy was main-
tained. Thus, on January 7, 1932, the·United States unilaterally 
published its note of nonrecognition, stating that the United States 
government would not 
Recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be 
brought about by means contrary to the convenants and 
obligations of the pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to 
which treaty both Ch~~a and Japan, as well as the United 
States, are parties. . 
Stimson's letter to Senator Borah the following February,. following 
the attack on the international garrison at Shanghai, reiterated this 
policy of nonrecognition and also discussed the moral obligations of 
signatories to uphold both the Nine Power Treatyand th~ Kellogg-Briand 
88 Pact. The United States was to adhere firmly to this policy of non-
recognition thereafter. 
Group B: The Small League Power 
Throughout the Sino-Japanese dispute, it tended to be the small 
states of the League of Nations which were most critical of Japan's 
violation of the Covenant, and which most strongly favored sanctions of 
89 some sort against Japan. Thus, while they considered the League's 
final policy of nonrecognition to be totally_inadequate, they were 
determined to carry it out as the only practical course. Why were the 
small powers so supportive of· the·· League resolutions? 
The support of the small-powers for the League in the Sino-Japanese 
controversy was largely based on their perception of the League's role 
in world affairs. They saw it as "an instrument for the promotion of 
peace through justice."80 Througout its history, they· were .the '"mo:;;t 
ardent advocates of open diplomacy and of a strict interpretation of 
85 
the Convenant in the League, as well as the· constant defenders of the 
rights and influence of the Assembly,"91 
While the small powers' championing of the . League was admirable, 
it was a course of action not totally devoid of self-interest. For the 
small states, weak in military power, the League was important as a 
body that could uphold t;:he territorial integrity of its members. "The 
maintenance of the principle of the Pact ••• [meant] more to the 
smaller and weaker states than to the wealthy and powerful nations."92 
Thus, the Manchurian Crisis was a. serious issue for the smaller powers, 
one that would show whether the League could or would protect the 
independence and sovereignty of its membe~s. If the League failed to 
support China, it would have failed the main purpose of the Covenant as 
far as the small states were concerned. 
Naturally, then, it was the small powers which most strongly 
supported China in the dispute. They were very critical of any atti-
tude which suggested that the size, importance, and special interests 
of Japan should be taken.into consideration. 93 Rather, they con-
stantly· maintained that firm measures should be taken against Japan, 
possibly .including economic sanctions. 94 Again, however, their policy 
cannot be said to have been totally unselfish. They had virtually 
nothing to lose and practically-everything to gain by supporting some 
collective action by the League against Japan. As they were: 
far removed from the scene of trouble and lacked any material 
interests in the Far East that were liable to suffer, [they] 
could and did showamoral fervour and determination to carry 
out the Covenant to the letter, such as the Great Powers 
could not afford to emulate.95 
It would be the latter which would have most at stake in such an 
action. Thus, while the small states did have grounds for supporting 
86 
the League, their attitude was largely based on the self-interest for 
which they so citicised the great powers. 
It may also be useful in this discussion to note the economic and 
diplomatic relations which the small League powers had with both Japan 
and China. In 1931, most of th~m did have foreign diplomatic and 
1 . . b h . 96 consu ar serv1ces 1n ot countr1es. Several of the small League 
powers maintained consular services in Manchuria even after the estab-
lishment of Manchoukuo. 97 In economic relations, however, one sees a 
different pattern. While most of the small powers had few economic 
assets in the East, some, like Belgium, did have a considerable financial 
stake in China. 98 Trade with Japan tended to be relatively unimportant. 
Thus, it does not seem implausible that the policy of some of the small 
pwoers regarding Manchoukuo was dictated, at least in part, by a 
concern for their economic interests in China. 
This is borne out of a study of Belgian policy in the crisis. In 
late 1932, the Belgian ambassador in Geneva conceded that Belgium's 
policy was in part based on financial considerations. He said that 
"no Belgian government could afford to side wi_th Japan at Geneva, as 
Belgium had to consider her trade interests in China; the Chinese 
would take it out on them if they did so."99 Two years later, the 
New York Times reported that "informed circles" in Burssels thought 
100 that Belgium was prepared to recognize Manchoukuo. While Belgium 
denied this, she did not rule out the possibility of future recogni-
tion, which she felt could be used "as a valuable argument in future 
. l . t" nlOl commerc1a negot1a 1ons. · While Belgium never did recognize 
Manchoukuo, these statements show that her policy toward both Japan and 
China in the dispute, was not uninfluenced by material considerations. 
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Ireland, or the Irish Free State as it was then known, provides a 
good example of a small powerwhichadamantly opposed Japan's actions 
in Manchuria and criticizedthehesitancy of the larger Le~gue powers to 
discipline Japan in any way. The then Irish President, Eamon deValera, 
who became president of the League Council in 1932, was especially 
critical of the way in which the interests of the larger League powers 
influenced final decisions, with the voice oEthe small powers counting 
for little. It may have beenw±th_this in mind that he said in his 
opening speech to the League Assembly in September, 1932, that 
People are saying that.the equality of states does not apply 
here in the things that matter, that the smaller states, 
whilstbeing given a voice, have little real influence in the 
final determination of League action, that they have not 
that which they were intended, or are entitled to, under the 
convenant.102 
In Irish newspapers, Japan was definitely seen as the aggressor in 
Manchuria. The Irish Independent, a middle-class paper, The Watchword, 
and The Irish Worker's Voice~ two working-class socialist papers, all 
agreed that Japan's actions were imperalistic. The Workers' Voice 
described Japan's presence in China as one of "imperialist oppression11103 
while The Watchword spoke of Japan's "colonisation policy."104 The 
Independent compared Japan's actions to the "empire Building."105 of 
the previous century. 
Her [Japan's] present claims in Manchuria and her attitude 
in enforcing them are strictly in accordance with the best 
traditions of the Great Powers in the nineteenth century, 
whether in China, India, or Africa, only, unfortunatelvb 
for her, that predatory ·hayday has now run its coutse. 1 6 
Irish opinion·wasequally critical of the League of Nations, The 
Watchword describing it as being made up of "Conservative, Imperialis-
. G "107 Th 1 1 f h L t1c overnments. e paper was a so very critica o t e ytton 
Report when it was published in the fall of 1932. 
The other countries have too many skeltons in their own 
cupboards to serious~y interfere with Japan. Great Britain 
has her Ireland, India, and South Africa; America has 
Phillipines, Cuba, Haiti; France her Syria and other 
protectorates • • • and hence Japan may well feel secure 
from moral opprobrium or effectual action.l08 
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The'Woiker' s Voice was equally critical, suggestbg that the "pro-
posals in the Report • [were] aprearranged affair with 
J d . h h . . 1 . . 1" t n109 apan an w1t t e 1nternt1ona 1mper1a 1s s. 
Thus, one finds a remarkable unity of opinion regarding the 
Sino-Japanese dispute, and who the guilty parties were. 
Whatever. their reasons, whether commerical or moral, the small 
powers were consistent in maintaining the League resolution of nonrecog~ 
inition. This attitude made them the focus of quite a large amount of 
hostility from Japan and Manchoukuo, the latter threatening to take 
110 economic measures against the small powers. Czechoslovakia, in 
particular, aroused a lot of hostility. A statement is.sued by Man-
choukuoan officials said, "it is within our power to deliver a servere 
blow to Czechoslovakia and other pronouncedly unfriendly powers through 
economic channels."111 Despite such threats, the small powers remained 
faithful to the resolution of nonrecognition throughout Manchoukuo's 
existence. 
Summary 
Many of the Leage members, then, chose to uphold the policy of 
nonrecognition. Yet, in almost every case, this adherence to the 
League's principals was not due to any feeling of moral obligation, 
but rather, due to self-interest. Just as most of the recognizing 
powers acted out of reasons of political expediency, so too did the 
nonrecognizing powers. 
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MANCHOUKUO'S FOREIGN POLCIY 
Introduction 
So far, the policies of other countries regarding Manchoukuo have 
been discussed, but what of Manchoukuo's own foreign policy? How did 
the Manchoukuoan government react to recognition or nonrecogntiion by 
the rest of the world? 
In the early days of the Manchoukuoan state, the attitude of the 
Manchuoukuoan government toward other nations had been extremely 
friendly, as the new state sought recogntiion.. Both in commercial and 
in legal matters, Manchoukuo asserted that itwould honor the commit-
ments previously made by China to other countries. Such assurances were 
soon found to be worth very little in practice, however, especially 
in the realm of trade. Manchoukuo mo;v~d- to, shut out otl?-er- nations. This 
was partly a plan to create a Japan-Manchoukuo commercial bloc, and also 
partly a coercive economic policy aimed at penalising countries which 
would not recognize Manchoukuo. 
Commercial Policy 
Early in its existence, Manchoukuo had guaranteed that it would 
respect the principle of th Open Door, the equality of commercial 
opportunity for all nations. 1 These promises were soon found to be 
meaningless, however, as Manchoukuo's whole economic policy worked 
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against the importation of western consumer good and promoted Manchoukuoan 
trade with Japan. 2 Between 1930 and 1937, foreign exports to Manchoukuo 
declined, except from Japan, whose exports rose dramatically, and the 
United States, whose exports remained at about the same level as before. 3 
Some foreign companies asserted that Manchoukuo's tariff system worked 
against foreign goods in favour of Japanese. 4 
The Manchoukuo government also passed various trade laws which 
limited Manchoukuo's foreign trade almost exclusively to Japan. The 
Foreign Trade Control Law of December 9, 1937, put numerous commodities 
under government control. 5 Wheat, flour, and sugar could be imported 
only from Japan, and rice imports were limited to Japan and Siam. 6 
Large scale imports of manufactured tobacco from China (Shantung) and 
America were not allowed. 7 In the export trade, sales of maize, castor 
seeds, hides, leather, furs, and lumber either were not allowed to coun-
tries other than Japan or were very limited. 8 Other laws followed which 
increased government control over trade and over industrial development. 9 
All of these measures were part of the Kwantung army's plans to create 
10 a war economy. Foreign trade was severely curtailed for imports 
from Japan. The only items imported from other countries were those 
required for constructionalschemes and not available from Japan. 11 
Foreign companies and commercial interests in Manchoukuo thus found 
themselves being forced out of the Manchoukuoan market. The Oil 
Monopoly Law of November, 1934 declared all petroleum products to be a 
government monopoly and restricted their production and distribution to 
agencies approved and licensed by the Manchoukuoan authorities. 12 The 
oil distribuiton trade was placed.in the hands of a government-created 
company, shutting out the Anglo-Asiatic Petroleum Company and the 
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American Standard Vacuum.OilCompany which together had previously managed 
over 80 percent of the oil sold in Manchuria. 13 Though foreign govern-
ments protested, the monopoly was not relaxed and foreign oil companies 
h d . hd f M h . 14 a to w1t raw rom anc ur1a. 
Other foreign companies were also forced to leave Manchoukuo, such 
as the British Jardine Engineering Company, the Czech Skoda Steel 
Work, the German Siemens Schukert Company, and the American concern of 
Andersen, Meyer, and Company, 15· While Japan professed a desire for 
foreign businesses and investment in Manchoukuo, all it really ·wanted 
was the latter. 16 
International Relations 
Manchoukuo's exclusive economic policy was closely linked to its 
general foreign polocy. Desperately wanting recognition, Manchoukuo had 
earlier indicated that it would be prepared to use economic pressure 
to persuade other countries to acknowledge its legitimacy. Despite the 
promise to maintain the Open Door, a 1933 press report said that 
Manchoukuo was considering the use of economic sanctions against the 
small powers of the League, who were the most vocal opponents of the 
17 new state. Officials were said to be toying with the idea of deliver-
ing "'a severe blow to Czechoslovakia and other pronouncedly unfriendly 
powers, through economic channels. 11118 
This idea of linking economic policy and recognition was picked 
up agin in 1934, when foreign governments protested to Japan over the 
Oil Monopoly Law. Japan asserted that Manchoukuo was an independent 
realm, outside of Japan's jurisdiction, but hinted that recognition 
on Manchoukuo might provide more direct access to the Manchoukuoan 
th 't' 19 au or1 1es. The following year, the London Times reported that 
Manchoukuo's assurances regarding the Open Door were conditional on 
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whether or not recognition had been accorded by the foreign governments 
interested in Manchoukuoan trade. 20 It was not until December, 1938 
however, that a more definite policy was stated. The New York Times 
reported from Shanghai that "henceforth Manchukuo will discriminate 
· · h d · f 1 · · n2l aga1nst nat1ons t at o not grant 1t orma recogn1t1on. In its 
foreign policy, Manchoukuo was said to diferentiate four groupings of 
countries: 
First, Japan, which forms a united front with Manchukuo. 
Second, the new governments that are being founded in 
occupi·ed area of China and Inner Mongolia. Third, Germany 
and Italy, who are allied with Japan in the anti-communist 
pact. Fourth, powers that have not recognized Manchukuo.22 
Likewise, when Manchouku~ began discussing the abolition of foreign 
extraterritorial privileges in 1935. it argued that this move was 
justified by the nonrecognition of Manchoukuo by certain powers. It 
was asserted that nonrecognizing countries had no rights in Manchoukuo, 
and thus could not continue to claim extraterritorial privileges for 
their nationals in Manchoukuo. 23 
Foreign claims ••• rested in Manchukuo's declaration of 
independence, in which existing treaty obligations were 
accepted. Foreign powers could not accept Manchukuo's 
promise while ignoring its independence.24 
These sentiments were reiterated by Chang Yen-chin, the Manchoukuoan 
Foreign Minister in July, 1936. He added that foreign governments 
would be invited to negotiate for the partial recognition of their 
rights, but otherwise these were to be abolished.25 
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Summary 
Thus, while Manchoukuo professed a desire for good relations with 
other nations, in practice it worked to close all interaction between 
itself and other states, with the exception of Japan, and of the major 
Axis powers. The economic policies of the Manchoukuoan regime dis~ 
couraged any foreign activity in Manchoukuo, while unilateral abolition 
of extraterritorial rights angered the foreign countries concerned. 
Manchoukuo's efforts to use threats against foreign rights and economic 
interests to induce other nations to recognize Ma~choukuo were on the 
whole a failure. Instead, these attempts at manipulation served only 
to antagonize foreign governments and increase the isolation of both 
Manchoukuo and Japan in the international -community. 
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Manchoukuo, despite its formal rejection by the League of Nations, 
and despite its own exclusive, almost antagonistic attitude in economic 
policy, succeeded in achieving quite a degree of acceptance by other 
powers. While in some instances this acceptance was implied rather than 
explicit, it existed nonetheless. Although Manchoukuo never became a 
state of any great importance in world politics, in itself, its very 
existence violated the principles of the Covenant of the League, and of 
the Washington and Kellogg-Briand treaties. Thus, any measure of recog-
nition by other governments, especially by governments of major nations, 
implied a rejection of these principles, and represented a victory for 
the aggressive policies of militaristic Japan. 
The recognition of Manchoukuo by countries like Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Spain, and the U.S.S.R. was especially important, because not 
only did these countries hold positions of political importance in the 
whole arena of world politics, they also, were all at one time, members 
of the League of Nations, which had established a nonrecognition policy. 
Indeed, excepting the U.S.S.R., which was not then a League member, they 
had all supported the adoption of this resolution of nonrecognition in 
1933. The acknowledgment of Manchoukuo by lesser members of the League, 
such as El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria, was 
also significant in that it further weakened the League's authority to 
103 
104 
arbitrate in international disputes. 
Perhaps even more significant were the relations which some nonrecog-
nizing nations maintained with Manchoukuo. France and Great Britain, the 
two most powerful members of the League, and the United States, never 
fully severed their ties with Manchoukuo. They maintained consuls there 
at least until 1937, and also carried on some trade with Manchoukuo, 
albeit a very. small amount. While maintaining cDnsuls there does not con-
stitute recoghition, as discussed in Chapter III, it certainly indicates 
more than nonrecognition. How can one maintain consuls in a state which 
possesses no legal existence? 
Moreover, there was also the possibility that even the strongest 
nonrecognizing nations, France, the United States, and Great Britain, 
eventually would recognize Manchoukuo's legitimacy as an independent 
state. France demonstrated that it was not opposed to the idea of 
economic negotiations with Manchoukuo as early as July, 1933. From the 
United States and Great Britain, there also came suggestions that Man-
choukuoan recognition was not out of the question. 
One can conjecture that even themost powerful Western nations might 
eventually have recognized Manchoukuo if it had not been for the out-
break of war in China in 1937, in Europe in 1939, and in the Pacific in 
1941. These conflicts pitted Japan and its allies against the major 
Western powers. Only the demise of Manchoukuo at the war's end in 1945, 
when it was given back to China, brought the recognition issue to an end. 
In 1938, Britain accepted Italian rule in Ethiopia even though it had 
been condemned by the League in 1935. This indicated that Britain could, 
and would, ignore League policy if it appeared advantageous to do so. 
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Only amongfue smaller League powers was there a vehement desire to 
adhere to the League resolution of nonrecognition, and even in their 
case, self-interest was the deciding factor, rather than any strong 
commitment to the League principles. Recognizing Manchoukuo and 
accepting Japan's militaristic actions there, would have undermined the 
only international agency to which the small League powers could turn 
to for protection if they were attacked. For their own protection, the 
small powers had to uphold the League and its commitment to protect the 
territorial integrity of its members. 
Why were some nations so reluctant to carry out the League resolu-
tion of nonrecognition which they had voted into being? In almost 
every case, as with the small League powers, it seems that it was a 
question of political expediency. For Germany, Russia, and other East 
European countries, recognition of Manchoukuo was a means of improving 
relations with Japan and its allies. For the nonrecognizing countries, 
the United States, Great Britain, France, and others, countinuing some. 
degree of relations with Manchoukuo reflected their need to placate 
Japan and protect their own commercial and territorial interests in 
East Asia, without offending the smaller League nations or China by 
overt recognition. 
The possibility of economic opportunities with Manchoukuo may also 
have influenced the attitude of some governments toward Manchoukuo, 
but, on the whole, these opportunities never materialized. Manchoukuoan 
trade .was predominantly with Japan. Ideology seems to have been the 
key factor in the Vatican decision to recognize Manchoukuo, as it 
had no commercial or territorial interests there. 
Despite widespread disregard for its policy toward Manchoukuo, the 
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League of Nations did not even verbally admonish any of the countries 
which accorded recognition to the new state. While this is perhaps 
understandable in the case of fairly important League members like Italy 
and Poland, and in the case of countries which were not members of the 
League, such as Germany and the Soviet Union, it is strange that the 
League failed to condemn such minor powers as El Salvador and the Domin-
ican Republic. 
By ignoring viol~tions of the nonrecognition resolution, the 
League undermined its own authority, showing-- that it was either unable 
or unwilling to intervene in a delic.ate international situation. While 
a verbal admonition would probably not have achieved anything, history 
would have at least recorded that the League of Nations had tried to 
uphold its principles and policies. Instead, however, it decided to 
"hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil", in a desperate hope that the 
situation would somehow disappear. By 1945, with the demise of 
Manchoukuo, the situation did vanish, but by that time, the League of 
Nations itself had dissolved. 
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